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DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE DISAGGREGATION OF NOERR
STEPHEN CALKINS*

A legal doctrine conceived in ambiguity seldom achieves clarity with
the passage of time. Such had been the experience with the Noerr-Penningon doctrine,' the principal focus of this article.' In its first NoerrPenningtondecision in 16 years, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. IndianHead,
Inc.,3 the Supreme Court created new uncertainties. However, it also
offered hope for resolution of some of the inconsistencies that have
plagued the doctrine. It did this by distinguishing sharply between harm
caused directly by petitioning activity (for which petitioners may be li* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author thanks Joseph D.
Grano, Richard E.V. Harris, George Hay, Maurice Kelman, Robert A. Sedler, and Paul
J. Van de Graaf for helpful suggestions, Joseph Bauer, John F. Dolan, J. Mark Iwry, E.
Thomas Sullivan, and Jonathan Weinberg for reviewing a draft, and several lawyers for
providing copies of briefs. Of course, none of these individuals shares responsibility for
errors or misjudgments.
IThe doctrine takes its name from Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965). These two cases, with California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972), provide the basic framework of the doctrine. Unless otherwise indicated,
all references herein to "Noerr" are to the doctrine, not the decision on which it is based
in part.
2 This is the second consecutive year in which the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been
a featured topic at the ABA Antitrust Section's annual "developments" program. See
Sullivan, Developments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (1987); see also R. Harris,
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: The Right to Petition and Government Decision Making, presented at the ABA Annual Meeting, Aug. 11, 1987. See generally Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust
1986-87: Power and Access (Part11), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 699, 720-28 (1988) (review of
developments).
As did Professor Sullivan, I will assume familiarity with the basic contours of the Noerr
doctrine. For more general overviews, see ABA Antitrust Section, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTs 613-19 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]; I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw ch. 2A (1978 & Supp. 1987); Kintner
& Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for PrivateRequests for Governmental Action: A CriticalAnalysis
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 549 (1984). Summaries of many
of the cases mentioned in this paper can be found in ABA Antitrust Section, State Action
and Noerr Gazette, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (1988).
1 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988).
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able), and harm caused by requested government action (for which petitioners may not), and by recasting the "sham exception" as being narrower
and less important than some courts had held. Whether Allied Tube will
eventually lead Noerr-Pennington out of its "quagmire '4 remains to be
seen.
This article will discuss Allied Tube, most of the recent Noerr-Pennington
developments, and, for the issues raised by these developments, the
implications of the Supreme Court's opinion. In addition, the paper will
briefly consider two recent cases that struggle with the tension between
competition policy and the first amendment, even though their outcomes
did not turn on Noerr. In SuperiorCourt Trial Lawyers Association v. Federal
Trade Commission,5 the D.C. Circuit rebuffed an FTC challenge to a publicized "strike" by the attorneys who regularly accept court appointments
to represent indigent defendants. The court ruled that the first amendment might protect the challenged activity even though Noerr did not.6
The second case, Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorney
General of the United States,7 interprets the Newspaper Preservation Act."
That Act embodies a congressional balancing of concerns about concentration and the preservation of diverse reportorial and editorial voices.
On August 8, 1988,** Attorney General Meese issued a troubling decision
applying that Act and approving a proposed Joint Operating Arrangement (JOA) between The Detroit News and the DetroitFree Press.9 A subsequent challenge to that opinion has been rejected by a district court
and, as of this writing, is on appeal. 1°
4 See generally Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-PenningtonDefense, 66 MICH.
L. REV. 333 (1967).
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,196 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988), petitionfor rehearingand
rehearing en banc filed, No. 86-1465 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988).
6 The court's discussions of Noerr are referenced where appropriate in the body of this
paper.
'7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,219 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1988) (Revercomb, J.), appeal
docketed, No. 88-5286 (D.C. Cir. argument scheduled for Oct. 28, 1988); see also Michigan
Citizens for an Independent Press v. United States Attorney, Civ. No. 88-2322 (D.D.C.
stay pending review ordered Aug. 17, 1988) (Green, J.).
s15 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1982).
** Editor'sNote: This article represents an updated and expanded version of the remarks
presented by the author at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law in
Toronto on August 10.
I In re Application by Detroit Free Press, Inc., and The Detroit News, Inc., for Approval
of a Joint Newspaper Operating Arrangement Pursuant to the Newspaper Preservation
Act, Dkt. No. 44-03-24-8 (order entered Aug. 8, 1988).
10Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorney General of the United States,
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,219 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1988) (Revercomb, J.), appeal docketed,
No. 88-5286 (D.C. Cir. argument scheduled for Oct. 28, 1988).
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I. NOERR-PENNINGTON
A.

THE UNSETTLED NATURE OF NOERR

In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,"
the Supreme Court held that certain petitioning of the government would
not result in antitrust liability. More than a quarter of a century later,
the scope of what has come to be known as the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine
2
remains unsettled.'
The root of the uncertainty is the failure to decide whether the doctrine
isfounded on constitutional principles. The Court in Noerr said that its
decision was based on statutory interpretation, 3 although it noted that
an alternative interpretation "would raise important constitutional questions." 4 UnitedMine Workers v. Pennington 5 is to the same effect. California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,16 although not inconsistent,
inched closer to a constitutional interpretation, referring to "First
Amendment rights" and concluding that "it would be destructive of rights
of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests
may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes.""
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
2 As Professor Sullivan observed in last year's talk, there is tension even among the

various purposes of the doctrine. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 361-62. The doctrine's purpose
is variously said to be the preservation of the right to petition, the guaranteeing of government access to important information, and the protection of the integrity of governmental decision-making. Compare Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38 (government need for
information, and respect for the right to petition) with CaliforniaMotor Transport, 404 U.S.
at 513 ("There are many... forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt
the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations.").
'1 365 U.S. at 132 n.6 ("Because of the view we take of the proper construction of the
Sherman Act, we find it unnecessary to consider any of these other defenses."). Although
the Court did not cite it, there is support in the legislative history of the Sherman Act for
this interpretation. See Note, The Misapplicationof the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in NonAntitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 n.I, 1250 n.33 (1984) [hereinafter
Stanford Note]; see also Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1304-09 (8th Cir. 1980) (reviewing
portions of legislative history addressing petitioning).
'1 365 U.S. at 138 (adding that the "right of petition is one of the freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to
invade these freedoms").
15381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965) ("The Sherman Act, it was held [in Noerr], was not intended
to bar concerted action of this kind ....); cf. id. at 670 n.3 (noting that trial judge could

nonetheless admit evidence of such action "if he deemed it probative and not unduly
prejudicial").
16404 U.S. 508, 512, 514-15 (1972).
17404 U.S. at 510-11 (although the Court held that the activity at issue in the case was
an unprotected "sham"); cf.404 U.S. at 516 (Stewart,J., concurring) (doctrine "was required
in order to preserve the informed operation of governmental processes and to protect the
right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment"); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
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Some commentators and courts have read this record and concluded
that, whatever its origins, the Noerr doctrine is now a matter of constitutional law;'S yet others continue to insist that it is a creature of statutory
interpretation. '9
Whether the foundation of the doctrine is constitutional or statutory
is important.2 Those who espouse the former belief-Professor Fischel
is perhaps the leading advocate-tend to interpret the doctrine narrowly,
as limited to the extent of constitutional protections. Those who believe
the latter, such as Professor Handler, tend to interpret the doctrine
expansively, as sheltering a much broader range of activity. 2' The basis
of the doctrine also is important, moreover, in determining its reach:
23
22
does it apply to state law? To the Federal Trade Commission Act?
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) ("In [CaliforniaMotor Transport] we recognized that
the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances."); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 399 n. 17 (1978) ("Cases subsequent to Pennington have emphasized the possible
constitutional infirmity in the antitrust laws that a contrary construction would entail in
light of the serious threat to First Amendment freedoms that would have been presented.")
(citing Justice Stewart's concurrence in CaliforniaMotor Transport, and citing Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962), where the Court
wrote that "imputing to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate political activity ... would
have encountered serious constitutional barriers").
"8See, e.g., Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis
and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 80, 81-84, 94-96 (1977);
see also Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 39, 61 (1980); Bern,
The Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Petitioning in Light of City of Lafayette's Restriction on
the State Action Immunity, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 279, 282-85; Note, Noerr-PenningtonImmunity
from Antitrust Liability under Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau,
Inc.: Replacing the Sham Exception with a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1305,
1306-12 (1984) [hereinafter Cornell Note].
" E.g., Handler & De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrineand its Sham Exception, 6 CAROOzo L. REV.
1, 3-5 (1984); Stanford Note, supra note 13 (arguing that Noerr's broad immunity should
not be extended to non-antitrust cases).
S2Accord Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion of the Noerr Pennington Immunity, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 291 (1981); Fischel, supranote 18, at 94; Hurwitz, Abuse of GovernmentalProcesses,
the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 79 (1985).
21 It is intriguing that on Noerr issues antitrust "conservatives" and "liberals" tend to
change stripes: those who customarily advocate a limited role for antitrust call for narrowing
Noerr's protection (i.e., expanding antitrust coverage), and those who commonly urge
"aggressive" antitrust policies call for broadening Noerr's protection. See L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, at 364; cf. Grip-Pak Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ch. 18
(1978); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19.
22 See G. Fruge Junk Co. v. City of Oakland, 637 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Calif. 1986)
(Schwarzer, J.) (since franchisee's complaints to city about violations of exclusivity provisions
were protected by first amendment, they could not violate state unfair competition law);
Kintner & Bauer, supra note 2, at 587-88 (doctrine is "constitutionally grounded" and
extends to state antitrust law).
13Cf. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 590 (1986) (Noerr is based
on First Amendment principles; opinion assumes without discussion that it applies in FTC
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To attempt the introduction of evidence? 24 To petitioning foreign gov6
ernments?2 5 To petitioning by governmental units?2
As a corollary to the disagreement over the foundation of Noerr, the
doctrine suffers from inconsistent characterizations. Some courts and
commentators have insisted that Noerr refers simply to a category of
conduct not condemned by the Sherman Act. 27 Others have described
Noerr as an "exemption" from the antitrust laws, although it is not always
clear whether this characterization is based on anything more than ease
of reference.28 The choice of characterization may have important concases), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,196 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 26, 1988), petitionfor rehearingand rehearingen bancfiled, No. 86-1465 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
7, 1988).
24See infra at notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
25 See Fischel, supra note 18, at 120-21 (since doctrine is constitutional, it has no foreign
application). Noerr's applicability to petitioning of foreign governments is worthy of at least
brief mention. See generally Note, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrineand the Petitioningof Foreign
Governments, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1984) (reviewing cases and arguing that all genuine
petitioning of foreign governments should be exempt). In the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Guide for International Operations (Jan. 26, 1977), the Department stated simply
that it "does not consider it [the doctrine] to be limited to the domestic area." Id. at 63.
The Department explained that although the doctrine "turns in part on U.S. domestic
constitutional considerations," the Supreme Court's decision in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), implied that Noerr extended to
petitioning foreign governments. Id. In its proposed new Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, the Antitrust Division quite deliberately noted that the doctrine "may
not apply to the petitioning of foreign governments by U.S. and foreign firms," since the
doctrine "rests on a construction of the Sherman Act that is derived at least in part by
reference to the First Amendment right to petition." The draft Guidelines state that it is
nonetheless Department policy "not to prosecute the legitimate petitioning of foreign
governments by foreign or U.S. firms in circumstances in which the United States protects
such activities by its own citizens." Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) Extra Ed. No. 2, at 71 (June
8, 1988). There is thus a new chariness about the extent of any immunity.
26 Some courts have reasoned that because Noerr "is intended to protect an individual's
first amendment rights" it does not protect petitioning by government officials and units.
Vartan v. Harristown Dev. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 430, 438 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (no protection
for a municipal development corporation and its chairman, acting in his official capacity);
accord Fisichelli v. Town of Methuen, 653 F. Supp. 1494, 1502-03 n.8 (D. Mass. 1987)
(inapplicable to druggist/city council member's efforts to have city council deny industrial
revenue bond to competing pharmacy); J. Fred Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 191 (N.D. I11.Jan. 15, 1987) (civil rights case applying Noerr) (villages do not
have "a first amendment shield from liability for petitioning activities"). But see, e.g., Unity
Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 196-97 (N.D. I11. 1986) aff'd on other grounds,
841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988) (lawsuit by government bodies protected; no discussion of
Noerr's applicability to petitioning by governments).
27
E.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(Schwarzer, J.) ("Noerr holds that this kind of joint activity does not fall within the scope
of the Sherman Act in the first place, not that it is removed from the act by an exemption"),
aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Crawford & Tschoepe,
supra note 20, at 305 n.71; Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 5; Sullivan, supra note
2, at 361.
2t
See, e.g., Bright v. Moss Ambulance Serv., Inc., 824 F.2d 819, 821 & n.l (10th Cir.
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sequences, however. If the Noerr doctrine is an exemption from the
antitrust laws, the doctrine may be subject to the usual rule that "exemptions from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly,"29 and
thus should be read less expansively than it would be otherwise.
There is general agreement on one point: Noerr does not protect sham
acts of petitioning.3 ° Thereafter the consensus on the sham exception
breaks down.
(1) Some commentators assert that sham litig;,tion is "an independent
variety of antitrust violation."'3' Others emphasize that the sham exception is an exception to the doctrine's protection, and that sham petitioning
3 2
by itself is not necessarily grounds for antitrust liability.
(2) Some authorities urge that Noerr protects all petitioning activity
except "sham petitioning"-that the sham exception is the only "exception" to Noerr, so to speak. Others argue that several categories of
1987); Note, The Commercial Exception: A Necessary Limitation to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 63 IND. L.J. 401,401-02 & n.5 (1988) [hereinafter Indiana Note] (doctrine "immunizes
from antitrust liability acts of petitioning the government," but "immunizes" is defined as
"conduct the Supreme Court never intended to proscribe by the antitrust laws"); see also
Crawford & Tschoepe, supra note 20, at 305 n.71 (1981) (protesting the mischaracterization
of the doctrine as an "exemption" and as conferring "immunity," but conceding that it
also would use these terms, even "[a]t the risk of entrenching this misconception").
29 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982); see Indian Head, 817
F.2d at 945 (quoting Union Labor). But see MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1155-56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (because of constitutional implications, read exceptions to Noerr narrowly); Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic
v. American Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (same), aff'd per curiam,
813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 160 (1987).
'o Even this is an overstatement, since some regard the sham exception as limited in
whole or in part to sham litigation. See, e.g., Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict
Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 41, 70 (1981) (branch of
exception concerned with unethical methods applies "solely to the adjudicatory process");
cf. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, at 203a (presumption against sham in legislative
context); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 18 (sham not found in any of the 20 cases
involving petitioning the legislature decided under Noerr).
' Balmer, supra note 18, at 39 nn. 2-3 (also noting that the usual elements of an antitrust
violation must be proved); see also Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision,
Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 722 (8th Cir. 1986) (upheld jury instruction saying "you may consider
those ['sham'] acts to have been unlawful conduct"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987);
Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Foundation, 783 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1986) (seemingly
equating finding of sham with finding of antitrust violation), criticized, Briggs & Calkins,
supra note 2, at 722-24.
32

E.g., P.

AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

203.6 (Supp. 1987).

" E.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (dictum)
(CaliforniaMotor Transport "construed the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a
lawsuit . . . unless the suit was a 'mere sham' "); Bright v. Moss Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
824 F.2d 819, 822-23 (10th Cir. 1987); Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac,
650 F. Supp. 1325, 1342 (E.D. Mi. 1986), aff'd per curiam, 849 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1988),
petitionfor cert.filed, No. 88-465 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1988); Stanford Note, supra note 13, at 1253.
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petitioning activity not qualifying as sham should not be subject to anti34
trust challenge.
(3) These differences are compounded by fundamental disagreement
35
over the test by which to identify sham petitioning.

B.

ALLIED TUBE

It was against this backdrop of unsettled law that two courts of appeals
recently rendered inconsistent opinions on the widespread practice of
industry members helping to prepare and amend model codes intended
for adoption by state and municipal governments. In Sessions Tank Liners,
Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing,Inc.,36 the Ninth Circuit held that Noerr "immunizes proper lobbying ... of a private association engaged in promulgating an important model code to influence legislative and executive
decisions."" The court reasoned that any excessively abusive activities
could be addressed through a broad reading of the sham exception. The
association at issue was the Western Fire Chiefs Association, a private,
nonprofit organization whose voting membership is limited to public
officials. The Association promulgates the "highly influential" Uniform
Fire Code." After a manufacturer of metal tanks, upset about loss of
replacement sales to in-ground tank lining firms (and, perhaps, concerned about the safety of the process) persuaded the Association to
mE.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 203.1.
The root of the disagreement over whether the only exception to Noerr is for sham
petitioning is Justice Douglas's strikingly casual opinion for the Court in CaliforniaMotor
Transport. After noting that Noerr had left open the sham exception, the Court's opinion
mentioned a variety of "forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the
administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations." 404 U.S.
at 513. The Court failed to indicate precisely which such practices would violate the antitrust
laws, under what circumstances, and according to what theory. The Court wrote, somewhat
inconsistently, that (1) the right to petition prevents liability for advocating positions to
the government, but "there may be instances where the alleged conspiracy 'is a mere
sham,'" 404 U.S. at 510-11 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144); and (2) petitioners' first
amendment "right of access" to government "does not necessarily give them immunity
from the antitrust laws," 404 U.S. at 513. Justice Stewart, concurring, protested that the
latter statement was '"totally at odds with Noerr," but concluded that "the real intent of the
conspirators was not to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but
to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking those processes."
Id. at 517-18 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). (Justice Stewart noted that
defendants allegedly had conspired to oppose reflexively a long series of applications for
operating rights.)
" See infra at Part C.5.
827 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S.Ct. 2862 (1988).
17 827 F.2d at 462; see also Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp., 573 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. I1. 1983) (same).
3 827 F.2d at 460.
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amend the Code to discourage in-ground tank lining, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in most respects a grant of summary judgment in the manu9
facturer's favor.
The Sessions court rejected the Second Circuit's decision in IndianHead,
Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.40 Indian Head had ruled that Noerr
does not protect the petitioning of "quasi-legislative bodies," such as the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which promulgates the
National Electrical Code. The Second Circuit also ruled that a manufacturer's right to petition state and local governments directly does not
extend to efforts to influence governments indirectly, by blocking an
amendment of a model code. The court reinstated a $3.8 million damage
award (before trebling).
The Supreme Court agreed to hear Sessions and Indian Head (Allied
Tube). The Court affirmed Allied Tube and remanded Sessions for recon4
sideration in light of its opinion. '
In one sense Allied Tube was an easy case. An NFPA professional panel
had recommended that polyvinyl chloride conduit be included in the
National Electrical Code's list of approved types of conduit. The defendant, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., the country's largest manufacturer
of steel conduit, then resorted to shockingly inappropriate behavior to
block the recommendation: in concert with other steel conduit interests,
it recruited and financed the NFPA memberships of 230 persons, many
with dubious credentials and little knowledge, and arranged for them
to attend the critical NFPA meeting, which it worked like a political
convention (complete with walkie-talkies) until it prevailed by a vote of
394-390.42 As Judge Lumbard wrote, for the Second Circuit, this was a
clear "subversion of the NFPA code-making process."43
In another respect, however, Allied Tube was a hard case. As the dissent
44
emphasized, over 400 private organizations promulgate model codes.
The code at issue here-the National Electric Code-was "the most
widely disseminated and adopted model code in the world today. '45 It
" For a description of the "narrow" cause of action left open to the plaintiff, 827 F.2d
at 469, see infra at notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
" 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988).
41 On remand, the Ninth Circuit noted that Allied Tube "explicitly rejected the approach
this court adopted in its disposition of this case," and ordered the case remanded to the
district court for further proceedings. 852 F.2d 484,485 (9th Cir. 1988). As of this writing
the Ninth Circuit's order is subject to a pending motion for reconsideration.
42 108 S. Ct. at 1935.
4' 817 F.2d at 943.
11 108 S. Ct. at 1944.

45 Id.
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had been adopted unchanged or with minor variations by hundreds of
municipalities and by all but six states.46 As Allied Tube vigorously contended, it would be "largely futile" to lobby state and local governments
directly: "The road to Albany, Phoenix and Sacramento begins at the
NFPA."47 Allied Tube, amici,4" and the dissent all argued that the important model code promulgating process was threatened by the Second
Circuit's opinion.
Allied Tube presented an unusual opportunity to consider damages
caused by petitioning itself, not by government action. The Second Circuit interpreted the complaint as not seeking redress for injuries suffered
when various governments adopted that code, but rather solely for harm
from the "stigma '49 of code non-approval, and Allied Tube's advertising
of that stigma. The Supreme Court accepted the Second Circuit's version
of the damage theory,5 ° and keyed its analysis to it, as follows:
"[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid
governmental action, as opposed to private action," those urging the
governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for

the anticompetitive restraint. In addition, where, independent of any
government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from
private action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability

if it is "incidental" to a valid effort to influence governmental action.

817 F.2d at 939 n.l.
4 Brief for the Petitioner at 25, Allied Tube.
s Brief of the Western Fire Chiefs Association, the International Conference of Building
Officials, the Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., and the Building
Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., Allied Tube; Brief of the State of Illinois as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Allied Tube ("The Second Circuit decision jeopardizes
the system of governmental reliance on model codes, by denying those concerned parties
with the greatest opportunity and motivation for valuable input, and which historically
have raised significant public safety issues before the code-making bodies, protection from
treble damage liability under the Sherman Act.").
19 108 S. Ct. at 1936 n.2 (quoting 817 F.2d at 941 n.3). The defendants unsuccessfully
protested this interpretation of the jury's findings. Brief for the Petitioner at 39, Allied
Tube.
("The complaint in this case ... contains no intimation of the 'stigma' theory.
Instead, it is based entirely on the theory that Carton's antitrust injury was prox[Tlhis
imately caused by the NEC's adoption by state and local governments ....
is the only theory of liability that was offered until the June 27, 1986, post-trial
hearing, at which Carlon for the first time raised the 'stigma' argument .... The
districtjudge rejected this new theory as a 'distortion' of what had been presented
to the jury .... ").
50108 S. Ct. at 1936 ("The jury then awarded respondent damages, to be trebled, of
$3.8 million for lost profits resulting from the effect that excluding polyvinyl chloride
conduit from the 1981 Code had of its own force in the marketplace. No damages were
awarded for injuries stemming from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental
entities.") (footnote omitted).
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The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr immunity,
varies with the context and nature of the activity. 5 '

In other words, the Court held that where, as here, a restraint on
competition results directly from petitioning (and not from governmental
action), Noerr does not protect all petitioning, even if genuine. Rather,
the test is whether a restraint "is'incidental' to a valid effort to influence
governmental action,' 52 which in turn "depends not only on its [the
effort's] impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity.""
Applying this standard, the Court found that Allied's petitioning had
been invalid and not deserving of Noerr's protection. The Court stressed
that "an economically interested party exercise[d] decision-making authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that
comprises market participants. '54 The Court contrasted this activity with
the lobbying campaign in Noerr, noting that only the latter was conducted
in "the open political arena," resembled "activity that has traditionally
been regulated with extreme caution," and bore "'little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act.' ,,"Although one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of
the Code to the conclusion that the conduct at issue here is 'political,'
5 108 S. Ct. at 1936 (quoting Noerrand citing it and Pennington)(emphasis added; brackets
by Court).
5 108 S. Ct. at 1936.
5'108 S.Ct. at 1939. The Court's restriction of protection to "valid petitioning" should
not be confused with efforts to limit protection to the seeking of valid governmental action.

For doubts about the utility of such a limitation, see P.

AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP,

supra

note 32 at 203.2. For an early discussion of this limitation, see Costilo, supra note 4, at
340-43 (no protection where governmental action was outside scope of authority).
One commentator has urged that "immunity not be granted when a group's petitioning
produces unnecessary direct antitrust injury and the governmental action sought by the
group is illegitimate." Note, A Standardfor TailoringNoerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely
to the First Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832, 832 [hereinafter Yale Note). The author
cites the commercial exception and the co-conspirator exception as examples of illegitimate
action. Id. at 843-45. The author also appears to suggest that Noerr immunity should turn
on the availability of the state action exemption, id. at 842-43, which is a suggestion that
has generally (and sensibly) been rejected, e.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521
F. Supp. 568, 583-85 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1133 (1983); Bern, supra note 18. The difficulty posed by an "unnecessary injury"
test should be clear to anyone who has suffered through the debates about the role of
"less restrictive alternatives" in antitrust law. Cf. Yale Note at 838 & n.33 (complaining that

current doctrine "does not inquire into the existence of alternative means of petitioning
that would cause less injury," and noting that there are "often a range of petitioning
methods" of varying harmfulness (and effectiveness) ).
"1 108 S.Ct. at 1942. Since Allied's activities were protectable, if at all, only as indirect
efforts to influence state and local governments (the Court having rejected the "quasigovernment" argument, see infra Part B.3), Allied's "petitioning" was regarded as including
the NFPA's decision not to accept the proposed amendment to the Code. Of course, had
Allied's orchestrating of that decision failed (as it almost did), there apparently would have
been no injuries at all.
11108 S. Ct. at 1940 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136).
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we think that, given the context and nature of the conduct, it can more
aptly be characterized as commercial activity with a political impact."56
Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, issued a stinging rejoinder:
[C]onduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either becomes
immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of a larger
design to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, or it does not.
No workable boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are established by declaring, and then repeating at every turn, that everything depends on
"the context and nature of" the activity, ante, at [1936], 1939 [twice],
1940, 1941, if we are unable to offer any further guidance about what
this vague reference is supposed to mean, especially when the result
here57is so clearly wrong as long as Noerr itself is reputed to remain good
law.

Indeed, repeating the words "context and nature" (five times, by my
count) contributes little to the establishment of clear guidelines for determining the validity of petitioning. Nor is clarity achieved by the majority's footnoted response to Justice White's concerns. The Court wrote
that its holding was "expressly limited to cases where an 'economically
interested party exercises decisionmakingauthority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants.' "58 The Court added that its opinion did not remove Noerr's
protection from all private standard-setting organizations, many of which
"are composed of members with expertise but no economic interest in
suppressing competition."59 The Court provocatively supported this assertion with a reference to Sessions;6 ° and, indeed, the identification of
restaints "incidental" to "valid" petitioning, and the scope of Noerr's protection for activities designed to influence model codes, will be unsettled
at least until that case is finally resolved.
Without diminishing the significance of these questions, which are of
considerable theoretical and practical importance, 6' three other aspects
-JId.at 1941.
11108 S. Ct. at 1944 (White, J., dissenting).
51108 S. Ct. at 1942 n.13 (emphasis by Court) (quoting id. at 1942).
59
1Id.at 1942 n.13 (arguing that the dissent "mistakenly asserts that this [the Court's]
description encompasses all private standard setting associations").
10108 S. Ct. at 1942 n.13 ("See, e.g., Sessions, 827 F.2d, at 460, and n. 2 [where the Ninth
Circuit noted that only WFCA members, none of whom represented private industry,
could vote in two key meetings]."). In contrast, the Justice Department and the FTC, as
amici, argued more sharply that all harm caused by petitioning activity that directly restrained trade (i.e., independent of government action) should be subject to the antitrust
laws. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 10, Allied Tube.
6' See also infra, note 73. For additional discussions of Allied Tube see Malina, Antitrust in
the Supreme Court-/ 988, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 287 (1988), and Sullivan, supra note 2, at 368
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of Allied Tube deserve attention. First, as noted, the facts permitted the
Court to distinguish sharply between a petitioner's liability for harm
caused by the requested, governmentally-imposed restraint, and for harm
caused directly by the petitioning activity itself. Second, the Court squarely
rejected the suggestion of the Sessions court that the sham exception
should encompass a variety of unethical conduct, even though the Court
also indicated that certain unethical conduct may not be protected by
Noerr. Third, the Court rejected the implicit view of the Sessions court
and the suggestion of the petitioners6 2 that a private code-enacting body
could qualify as "governmental" where the code is widely adopted by
state and local governments.
Each aspect of the Court's opinion separates parts of the Noerr doctrine
that all too frequently have been combined. In effect, the Court "disaggregated" Noerr. Even greater clarity could have been achieved had
the Court identified that part of Noerr that is constitutionally compelled,
not merely a matter of statutory construction.
The following discussion explores each of these aspects of Allied. The
paper then reviews some common Noerr issues in light of recent cases
and the potential impact of Allied. After the conclusion of the consideration of Noerr, the paper will briefly discuss SuperiorCourt TrialLawyers
and the proposed Detroit JOA.
1. Reduction in Scope and Importance of Sham Exception
In Allied Tube the Supreme Court clarified the sham exception, rendering it narrower and less essential than some courts and commentators
had thought. The rejected position was roughly as follows: All petitioning
activity was exempt from the antitrust laws. The only exception was sham
activity-but that was a broad, malleable concept. The sham exception
was said to apply either for when a defendant's petitioning was not
"genuine" or, in the words of the Ninth Circuit in Sessions, when "the
defendant genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does
(discussing lower court opinion).
The importance of Noerr-Pennington to standard-setting organizations should not be
exaggerated. Two recent cases illustrate that what could be considered Noerr issues more
appropriately-and in ways equally satisfying to defendants-can be addressed as questions
of substantive antitrust law. In both Consolidated Metal Prods, Inc. v. American Petroleum
Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988), decided before Allied Tube, and in Clamp-All Corp. v.
Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (Ist Cir. 1988), decided after Allied Tube, appellate
courts approved awards of summary judgment to defendants in trade association products
specification cases. In each instance the court ruled that competition had not been restrained. The cases demonstrate appreciation for the importance of certification activities
and give trade associations considerable lattiude as they engage in them-a result achieved
without reference to Noerr-Pennington.
"I Brief for the Petitioner at 17, 21, Allied Tube; infra note 90.
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so through impropermeans.""' (Sessions reasoned that unethical petitioning
can be considered sham because "there is a pretense of seeking an Independent, impartial decision."64)
This extension of the sham exception to two kinds of conduct-the
second of which has nothing to do with the ordinary meaning of sham' 5has caused much mischief. The extension forced the square peg of
unethical conduct into the round hole of the sham exception. At best
the effort was inelegant; at worst it led to inconsistent decision-making.
Since some judges believed that Noerr had no exceptions other than for
sham petitioning, 66 prudent litigants would structure their arguments in
terms of that exception. Attention was thus diverted from important
issues to questions of definition.6 1 Moreover, some judges would rely on
the narrow meaning of sham to conclude that unethical petitioning was
unprotected.68 Who knows how such cases would have been decided had
attention not been focused on the meaning of "sham"?
Sessions, 827 F.2d at 465 n.5 (emphasis in the original); accord Kintner & Bauer, supra
note 2, at 571 ("either when the defendant has no real desire to prevail in the proceedings,
but is using them in injure competitors, or when the defendant has engaged in certain
prohibited conduct," such as unethical or illegal behavior, or conspiracy with a government
official (sometimes), or the providing of false information to certain kinds of tribunals)
(emphasis added); see aLso, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc.,
800 F.2d 711, 722 (8th Cir. 1986) (jury instruction upheld:
The defendants are entitled ... to use genuine efforts to influence public officials
but if in fact defendant's lobbying activities included threats, intimidation, coercion
or other unlawful acts, then you may find that such activities were not genuine
efforts to influence public officials and you may consider those acts to have been
unlawful conduct.),
cert. denied. 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Draft Department ofJustice Guidelines for International
Operations (June 8, 1988), Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) Extra Ed. No. 2, at 70 ("Examples of
sham petitioning include ...the deliberate misleading of the government during such
administrative proceedings"); Crawford & Tschoepe, supra note 20 (review of broadening
of "sham exception"); Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se
Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 399 (1987) (commercial bribery falls within sham
exception).
For a particularly thoughtful advocacy of an expansive reading of the sham exception,
see Fischel, supra note 18, at 106 ("The sham exception should be reinterpreted to encompass all petitioning activity which is unprotected by the first amendment.")
' Sessions, 827 F.2d at 465 n.5 (citing Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 109).
15 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1308 (2d college
ed. 1982) ("1. formerly, a trick of fraud 2. a) an imitation that is meant to deceive; counterfeit
b) hypocritical action, deceptive appearance, etc.")
r"See supra note 33.
61See Cornell Note, supra note 18, at 1311-12 (lamenting "the exception-to-the-exemption

analysis").
11There are numerous examples of the mischief caused by the over-glorifying of the
sham exception. in Premier Elec. Construction Co. v. IBEW, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,990 (N.D. Ill.
1985), revd, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987), for instance, the district court
dismissed a suit challenging the enforcement of a per se illegal agreement between con-
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The most salutary lesson of Allied Tube is that the sham exception
should be limited to conduct that is "sham" in the conventional sense of
the word: the exception applies "to cover activity that was not genuinely
intended to influence governmental action.""' In language that is unusually clear (although not essential to the Court's holding), the Court
specifically rejected Sessions's dual-meaning view of the exception. The
Court wrote that "[s]uch a use of the word 'sham' distorts its meaning
and bears little relation to the sham exception Noerr described to cover
activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental ac7
tion." 0
The Supreme Court's opinion should redirect attention to the identification of activities not deserving of Noerr's protection. It seems reasonably clear that the sham exception normally should not extend to
unethical conduct such as misrepresentation, bribery, and conspiracy. If
anything, these are likely to be the product of particularly fervent interests in governmental action. 7 1 Yet the Allied Court also indicated that
Noerr does not protect all such unethical conduct. 72 Since the sham exception does not apply, it must be that some kinds of activities never
qualify for Noerr's protection in the first instance. Under the Allied Tube
structure of analysis, this must mean that the restraint was the result of
invalid governmental action or, more likely, of private action, where the
7
restraint was not "incidental" to a "valid" petitioning effort. 1
tractors and a union establishing an industry-wide fund. The court reasoned that although
the agreement was illegal, all litigation (including litigation enforcing illegal agreements)
is immune unless "sham" (which this clearly was not). 1986-1 Trade Cas. at 62,074-75.
Fortunately, the court of appeals was not similarly distracted by the attention to the sham
exception, and ruled that the constitution "does not protect efforts to enforce private
cartels." 814 F.2d at 376. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion reversing a district
court's dismissing a case challenging misrepresentations to government agency acting
judicially, lamented the district court's "rather lengthy opinion focused almost entirely on
the 'sham exception.' " St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948,
955 (11th Cir. 1986).
108 S. Ct. at 1941 n.10.
108 S. Ct. at 1941 n.10 (quoting Sessions' "improper means" language); see also 108 S.
Ct. at 1937 n.4 ("private action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable governmental action is a mere sham that cannot be deemed a valid effort to influence government action"). The Court explicitly criticized those courts that had used the doctrine
more expansively to include "activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity (probably
based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and context of the activity)." Id.
71 (f. J. Fred Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191 (N.D. 1I1.Jan.
15, 1987) (civil rights case applying Noerr) (making false statements to government agency
not sham; no facts "suggest that defendants did not desire to obtain a favorable decision").
72 Allied Tube, 108 S. Ct. at 1937 (certain "unethical and deceptive practices ... may result
in antitrust violations") (footnote referencing the sham exception omitted); id. at 1941 n. 10
("the dissent does not dispute that the types of activity we describe [including, e.g., bribery],
could not be immune under Noerr") (citation omitted).
71 See supra at text accompanying notes 49-56.
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2. Distinction between Direct and Indirect Harm
From the beginning, some Noerr-Penningtoncases have distinguished
between harm caused by petitioned-for government action and harm
caused directly by petitioning. The trial court in Noerr itself declined to
award damages for harm inflicted by the gubernatorial veto that defendants' successfully sought, even while it awarded damages for the cost
of "defensive" public relations."4 The Supreme Court opinion in Noerr,
which reversed the lower court's award of damages, noted that "where
a restraint ... is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to
private action, no violation of the Act can be made out."75 So also, in
Pennington, the Court wrote that affected parties could not collect damages for a government official's decision to require suppliers of coal to
pay minimum wages.7 6 A number of more recent authorities also distinguish between direct harm and harm from requested action.77
7"The bulk of the damages awarded by the Noerr trial court went to the truckers' trade
association, which recovered $217,358, trebled, this being the amount the trade association
had been forced to spend in a defensive public relations campaign. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf., 166 F. Supp. 163, 168, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd,
273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Because the individual plaintiffs
stipulated that damages could be limited to injuries flowing from a governor's veto of a
bill that increased ceilings on truck weights, 365 U.S. at 130, they could not recover for
reputational injuries. The trial court denied the request for damages recompensing injuries
flowing from the veto, reasoning that a court "cannot award money damages for injuries
proximately resulting from a duly promulgated executive act." 155 F. Supp. 768, 836 (E.D.
Pa. 1957). The individual plaintiffs recovered only nominal damages (six cents each,
trebled). Id.
75365 U.S. at 136 (citing United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
76381 U.S. at 671 ("the jury should have been instructed ... to exclude any damages
which [plaintiff] may have suffered as a result of the Secretary's Walsh-Healey determinations").
77E.g., Premier Elec. Construction Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,
376 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[lit is important to identify the source of the injury to competition. If the injury
is caused by persuading the government, then the antitrust laws do not apply to
the squelching (Parkerv. Brown) or the persuasion (Noerr-Pennington).If the injury
flows directly from the "petitioning-if the injury occurs no matter how the
government responds to the request for aid-then we have an antitrust case.
When private parties help themselves to a reduction in competition, the antitrust
laws apply.")
(denying immunity to enforcing of private cartel); Midwest Construction Co. v. Illinois
Dept. of Labor, 684 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1988) (labor union's motion to dismiss
granted where construction company's injury flowed from Labor Department's legitimate
(albeit anticompetitive) enforcement of in-state-labor preference law at the request of
defendant union); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 344, 354 (N.D. Tex.
1985) ("injuries were caused by the governmental action which the private defendants
genuinely attempted to secure and succeeded in securing"), aff'dper curiam on basis of lower
court opinion, 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987); In re Airport
Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568,574 (N.D. Cal. 198 1) (judgment to defendants

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57

However, numerous cases give little attention to the distinction. 7 This
failure may be explained by the posture of the cases, which frequently
arise on summary motions; 79 few courts have had to be specific about
the damages claimed. Sometimes this ambiguity redounds to the benefit
of plaintiffs: for example, when harm stems from government action
triggered or encouraged by unpleasant petitioning. 0 Sometimes this
ambiguity redounds to the benefit of defendants: for example, when
plaintiffs are harmed directly by the defendant's petitioning but the
court's decision slides quickly into consideration (and rejection) of the
8
sham exception. '
As noted above, Allied Tube reemphasized and reaffirmed the distinction between harm caused by requested, valid governmental action and
where major car rental firms persuaded airport authority to adopt restrictions on access
to terminal: any competitive restraint "flows, not from the joint action of defendants, but
from the airport authorities' exercise of their statutory authority and duty to manage the
facilities in their charge"), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133
(1983); Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 107 F.T.C. at 590, 596; P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 32, at 11-12 ("if the action requested by the antitrust defendant is undertaken
by the government, there is no private restraint of trade") (but footnoting reference to
later discussion of the likelihood that petitioning with "improper means" could result in
liability).
For an early example of "direct" injuries, see Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendants' protests to ICC,
althoughultimately unsuccessful, delayed publication of plaintiff's desired rate, deterred
business by casting a "cloud" on the rate plaintiff was using, and imposed litigation costs),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
78See, e.g., Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Jose, 841 F.2d 886 (9th
Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of suit challenging redevelopment agency's and city's decision not to build parking structure needed by plaintiff), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 87-2086
(U.S. May 31, 1988); cases cited infra notes 80-81; cf. Airport Car Rental Litig., 521 F. Supp.
at 575 (noting that this part of Noerr "perhaps has not received the attention it deserves").
7'Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 15 (of 198 reported court Noerr decisions between
1961 and 1980, 158 decided motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment) (numbers said to be "approximate").
" 0E.g., Instructional Sys. Development Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 817 F.2d
639, 650 (10th Cir. 1987) (denying summary judgment where defendant may have influenced school driver education purchasing officials with "conduct unprotected by the NoerrPennington doctrine"); Central Telecommunications, Inc v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800
F.2d 711, 722 n.l I (8th Cir. 1986) (upheld jury award of damages where defendant used
"heavy-handed tactics" to "frighten[]" a city into awarding it a franchise), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 910 (1987); St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (suit challenging misrepresentations leading to denial of hospital certificate of
need should not have been dismissed); Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 653 F.
Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1987) (allegations of conspiracy precluded dismissal of suit challenging
urban renewal authority's condemnation of plaintiff's building).
11E.g., Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1986) (defense summary judgment
affirmed where lawsuit that allegedly was filed to prevent sale of industrial revenue bonds
in part by creating financial insecurity was deemed not "sham"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035
(1987); cf. Potters Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Noerr protected opposition to certification of rival hospital; opinion limited to sham
exception).
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harm caused directly by the requesting: the former cannot be the basis
of antitrust liability, whereas the latter can.82 The Allied Tube inquiry into
whether a restraint is "incidental" to "valid" petitioning arises only when
harm has been caused directly by petitioning. Allied Tube is important
because the plaintiff's theory of damages permitted the distinction to
be presented with unusual crispness; it also is important because here,
unlike in Noerr,85 the distinction led to a victory for the plaintiff.
In the future, courts presumably will use this distinction between direct
and indirect harm as the starting point for analysis.84 If "absolute immunity" really is absolute,8 5 the first step in any Noerr analysis, at least
for a private damages action,86 will be to determine whether the plaintiff
12This distinction is a cousin to, but different from, the distinction between sham and
other petitioning. See infra at Part C.5. The former distinction turns on tile source of the
harm to competition; the latter typically on whether the defendant's interest in instigating
government action (as opposed to directly harming competition) was a significant motivating factor for the petitioning. Petitioning that directly harms competition may or (as
in Allied Tube) may not be sham.
83Although the Noerr trial court had found that "[i]t was the [truckers'] purpose and
intent.., to hurt the truckers in every way possible even though they secured no legislation,"
365 U.S. at 142 (quoting lower court; emphasis omitted), and although the trial court in
fact found that "the more important [phase] of the campaign ... [was] vilification designed
to destroy the good will of the long-haul trucking industry," 155 F. Supp. at 814, the
Supreme Court interpreted these findings as meaning "no more than that the truckers
sustained some direct injury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influence
governmental action and that the railroads were hopeful that this might happen." 365
U.S. at 143. The Court observed that some direct, incidental injury is the "inevitable"
byproduct of a publicity campaign. Accordingly, letting liability turn on the existence of
such injury, even where the petitioner was aware of or even pleased by its prospect, would
be tantamount to barring all publicity campaigns. 365 U.S. at 143-44.
See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68, 196,
at 59,309 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988) (restraint resulted from private action, so immunity
depended on "context and nature" of activity; immunity denied, but finding of liability
reversed on other grounds), petition for rehearingand rehearing en banc filed, No. 86-1465
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988); cf. Smith v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 68,224, at 59,447-48 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1988) (where defendant instigated a
prosecutor's search of plaintiffs' residence that resulted in a criminal conviction, Noerr
protected defendant because any harm resulted from the government action; summary
judgment affirmed, although Allied Tube was said not "to speak to the present case, where
the defendants resorted to the courts") (opinion not recommended for full-text
publication).
85For a suggestion that Noerr's declaration that "no violation" can result from "valid
government action" is too sweeping, see, e.g., Costilo, supra note 4, at 348-53 (noting
exceptions for misrepresentations and bribery).
' For a brief suggestion that Noerr conceivably might be less protective of a government
criminal or injunctive suit than of a private treble damages suit, see Costilo, supra note 4,
at 351-52 (noting that this distinction is "not completely satisfying"). See generally Calkins,
Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
Antitrust System, 70 GEo. L.J. 1065 (1986) (discussion of interrelationship of sanctions and
substantive law). The discussion in this paper is limited to private damages actions, which
is the context in which Noerr issues most frequently arise, although this does not mean
that standards for government or private equitable actions would necessarily be different.
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is seeking damages for harm caused by governmental action. If so, the
inquiry should end, regardless of whether the defendant engaged in
87

unethical conduct.

Where damages are sought for harm inflicted directly by petitioning
or by some other anticompetitive conduct, however, Noerr's protection
is limited to harm that is "incidental" to "valid" petitioning, which depends on "the context and nature of the activity." Focusing on harm
caused directly by petitioning may make a court more willing to find
liability for unethical conduct than has been the experience heretofore.
All too often, consideration of whether petitioning should be protected
has been infected by a concern that private parties should not be liable
for governmental action." Presumably some of the unethical conduct
that led to liability under a broad sham exception would result in liability
as "invalid" petitioning.
3. Distinction between "Governmental" and "Private"
The Allied Tube Court conceded that the "dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting from
private action may not always be obvious." 9 However, it had little trouble
drawing the distinction in Allied Tube: the NFPA was a private organi,TThat unethical conduct does not lead to antitrust liability in no way indicates that it
will go unpunished. Numerous federal, state, and local statutes condemn improper petitioning of government. Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 11 n.51 (citing statutes and
judicial decisions). Some threaten penalties considerably more unpleasant than treble damages. See, e.g., CaliforniaPoliticiansSmart After FBI Employs a 'Sting' to Pursue Corruption,The
Wall Street J., Sept. 10, 1988, at 10, col. 2 (describing undercover operation that traded
financial assistance for legislative support for a bill, which was passed, aiding a fictitious
firm). Many have argued that "use of the Sherman Act as a vehicle for regulation of
lobbying whose object is anticompetitive would be an irrationally piecemeal way to deal
with lobbying abuses." E.g., Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence
Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 851 (1968). Although Fischel claims this "misses
the point" because the Sherman Act is a "separate statutory mechanism with different
purposes and remedies," Fischel, supra note 18, at 95, in fact it is Fischel who misses the
mark. If non-antitrust laws adequately deter lobbying abuses, the deterrence purpose of
antitrust-which Fischel presumably believes is the predominate purpose-does notjustify
applying it here. If deterrence is inadequate, something more than occasional antitrust
exposure is needed. As for antitrust's compensation purpose, it may justify liability for
directly caused harms, but it has much less relevance where the harm is caused by governmental action.
" Cf. cases cited supra note 81; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, at 12, Union Pac. Ry. v. Energy Transp. Sys., 108
S. Ct. 701 (1988) (certiorari denied) (using concern about liability for governmental action
to argue that successful litigation should never result in liability). Professors Areeda's and
Turner's concern about the "causation problem" is the motivating force behind much of
their analysis of the treatment of unethical conduct. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 2, at 204d.
" 108 S. Ct. at 1938; cf.Sessions, 827 F.2d at 462 ("The labels 'governmental' and 'private'
are, however, of limited utility.").
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zation. No official authority had been conferred on it, and its members
were private individuals, unaccountable to the public. Many members
had financial interests in the outcome. Government reliance on the organization's work product did not make the organization public. 9° And
once the Court concluded that the NFPA was private, restraints flowing
directly from its decisions and efforts to influence them could be protected under Noerr only if they were "incidental" to "valid" efforts to
petition state and local governments. The Court found that they were
not.
Not all cases will prove so easy. Intriguingly, the Court referenced its
observation about the elusiveness of the distinction between restraints
flowing from governmental and from private action with citations to
cases discussing the "co-conspirator," "bribery," and "commercial" exceptions to Noerr.9 1 Although the point was not explicitly addressed as
such, Allied Tube probably left intact the line of cases holding that an
anticompetitive agreement subsequently ratified by a government body
92
may not be protected by Noerr.
4. Foundationof Noerr
One aspect of Noerr that was not greatly clarified by Allied Tube was
the foundation of the Noerr doctrine. Defendant Allied Tube opened its
argument by protesting that Noerr is simply a creature of statutory interpretation, and not a constitutional doctrine creating an antitrust "exemption."93 The plaintiff dismissed this concern as "semantic quibbling."'
90In Sessions, in contrast, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that lobbying the private Fire
Chiefs Association was protected, since the Association, "whether designated as 'public,'
'private,' or even 'quasi-governmental,' plays an important and generally accepted role in
the legislative process of the western states." 827 F.2d at 463.
91 108 S. Ct. at 1938 n.7.
912
See Indian Head, 817 F.2d at 945 ("several courts of appeals have drawn a distinction
between the submission of a group's recommendations to the government and the antecedent conduct which generated those recommendations") (citing cases); see also Costilo,
supra note 4, at 344-46 ("it is useful to determine whether the government merely adds
its rubber stamp to the private anticompetitive scheme, or whether there is a more searching
independent inquiry"). Hurwitz has argued that Noerr should not protect regulatory rate
filings when governmental review is merely a formality, Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 88-90;
Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that rate filings should be presumptively unprotected, for
want of governmental "causation," P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 206.1
(reviewing cases). See generally R. BORK, supra note 21, at 352-53 (in Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), trade was restrained
by the enforcement of an invalid patent, not by any decision of the patent office or of a
court).
" Brief for the Petitioner at 17-18 (citing, most devilishly, an article co-authored by
Richard De Sevo, one of the lawyers laboring on behalf of the respondent, see Handler
& De Sevo, supra note 19, at 5).
9' Brief for the Respondent at 22 n.33.
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The Court rather self-consciously avoided discussing whether Noerr's
footings are constitutional or statutory, and thus missed an opportunity
to clarify a fundamental issue. By freely referring to the doctrine as
conferring "immunity,"'

5

the Allied Tube opinion perhaps implies that

the doctrine's constitutional roots are preeminent, but such an important
issue should not be decided by implication."
C. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATION OF ALLIED TUBE

Allied Tube is not the only recent Noerr decision. This article will review
these other cases and the likely effect of Allied Tube on each of the

principal "exceptions" to Noerr-misrepresentation, co-conspirator, bribery, commercial activity, and sham petitioning. Finally, this discussion
'
of Noerr considers what I call Noerr's "penumbra."97
1. Misrepresentation
Prior to Allied Tube, the "black letter" law on the misrepresentation
exception was reasonably well settled. ' It was reiterated most recently
as dicta in Allied itself: "A publicity campaign directed at the general
public, seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity
even when the campaign employs unethical and deceptive methods. But
in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive practices can constitute
abuses of administrative or judicial processes that may result in antitrust
violations."99 The Allied Tube Court cited Noerr, which held that a deceptive publicity campaign designed to influence public legislators and
government executives was protected activity,... and California Motor
!1'108 S. Ct. at 1934, 1936-39, 1941-42. Compare Allied Tube, 108 S. Ct. at 1943 (White,
J., dissenting) (Noerr "held that the Sherman Act should not be construed to forbid joint
efforts by railway companies seeking legislation that would disadvantage the trucking
industry") with id. at 1943-45 (several references to immunity).
' Allied Tube does not preclude my tentatively preferred approach, namely, to regard
the doctrine as an exercise in statutory interpretation to be conducted with an appreciation
that certain conceivable interpretations might be unconstitutional. This is the approach
taken in Noerr itself. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. As some have expressed
it, Noerr is a statutory doctrine with a constitutional "core." Statutory interpretation while
conscious of the Constitution is common, see Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), and would be sensible here. Because of the constitutional "core," the decisions
relying on the doctrine's perceived constitutional foundation would have to be rethought,
not automatically rejected.
117See infra Part C.6.
See generally P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 204.1
108 S. Ct. at 1936-37 (citations and footnote referring to the sham exception omitted).
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140 ("Insofar as that [Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all,
it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and.., a publicity campaign
to influence governmental action falls clearly into the category of political activity.") The
deception in Noerr involved use of "the so-called third-party technique." Id.; see infra notes
126-27 and accompanying text.
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Transport. In the latter case, the Court explained that "[m]isrepresentations,
condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process."" In any Noerr misrepresentation case, therefore,
the critical question has been whether the recipient of the communication2
was legislative or executive, on the one hand, or judicial, on the other."1
Two recent illustrations come from the Ninth Circuit.'°3 In Sessions, a
manufacturer of metal tanks allegedly gave erroneous information to
the Western Fire Chiefs Association as part of an effort to discourage
use of in-ground tank-lining.'0 4 The Association used this information
in amending a model code, but fire officials also may have relied on this
information to deny work permits even before the code was amended.
The court ruled that the Association was acting as a quasi-legislature
when it amended the code, and thus any misrepresentations to it in that
capacity were protected. 0 5 On the other hand, requests for fire chiefs
to deny permits before the code was amended "involved more a matter
of administering than of making law," so misrepresentations in any such
requests were not protected.'0 6
In Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Jose," 7 the plaintiff
was harmed when a redevelopment agency cancelled plans to build a
parking garage, allegedly because a rival developer had deceived the
agency about the availability of parking. The issue thus was whether the
redevelopment agency had acted as a legislative or judicial body. The
court chose the former, reasoning rather unsatisfactorily that the agency
must have been legislative because its recommended decision was reviewed by the city council.0 8
01404 U.S. at 513.
Most authorities regard administrative agencies as "judicial" for this purpose, at least
when the agencies are using formal trial-like procedures. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 2, at $ 204c; Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 84-85; Kintner & Bauer, supra note 2,
at 568 n.77. But cf., e.g., W. Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 38 (reviewing
range of informal, hybrid, and formal rulemaking procedures).
"o1See also St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (health planning agency deciding whether to issue hospital certificate of need
is "acting judicially," so misrepresentations to it are not protected); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.N.J. 1987) ("furnishing false and misleading information to Congress ...is entitled to protection as political speech") (products liability
case).
01For a fuller discussion of the case, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
"'s 827 F.2d at 468
827 F.2d at 468 (emphasis in original).
1077 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
67,911 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1988) (Wallace, J.), petitionfor
cert.filed, No. 87-2086 (U.S. May 31, 1988).
108The flaws in this reasoning have been exposed by Allied Tube. If subsequent consideration by a governmental body does not make a decision governmental (Allied Tube), why
,02
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This distinction between misrepresentations to a legislature and misrepresentations to a judicial body is not without support.'09 There are
differences between the verbal rough-and-tumble of a legislature and
the more restrained, refined atmosphere of most litigation.'" 0 Judges are
expected to be impartial, and to base their decisions on a record; judicial
decisions are thoroughly reviewable but then are final. In contrast, legislatures are perpetually mediating among interests, drawing on a galaxy
of factors-some publicly disclosed, some not-in making decisions. The
judiciary's relatively passive role may make it more dependent on the
veracity of those appearing before it.
Nonetheless, the differences between the legislature (and executive)
and the judiciary can be exaggerated. 1 ' More important, it is not clear
that these differences inevitably should support different antitrust exposure for deliberate misrepresentations of facts. "I Standards of conduct
may differ, but do any standards countenance such behavior?"' Differences in record-keeping may make proof easier in one situation than
another, but that does not justify different liability rules. To be sure,
there will inevitably be severe problems causally connecting misrepresentations and government restraints-but that is true regardless of the
decision-maker. "' Moreover, causation is not a concern for those lawsuits
should subsequent consideration by a legislative body make the initial decision-maker
legislative?
"' E.g., Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1261 (9th Cir. 1982) (political debate may reveal falsity, whereas adjudicators rely on the
accuracy of information supplied by parties), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); 1 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 204c-204d (the more formal the proceeding, the higher the
standards of expected conduct, the easier to identify violations of standards, and the easier
to show causation); Bien, supra note 30, at 55 n.56 (arguing that misrepresentation and
deception in political campaigns is to be expected); Holzer, An Analysis for Reconciling the
Antitrust Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington In Light of Cantor v. Detroit
Edison, 27 EMORY L.J. 673, 691 (1978) (arguing that the degree of protection should
depend on the nature of the petitioned body, because lobbying the legislature, which is
necessarily political, "deserves the highest First Amendment protection").
I am indebted to Richard Harris for forcefully emphasizing the differences.
For instance, Costilo distinguishes between "clearly political activity," where puffing
is expected, and "the filing of highly technical factual data" the accuracy of which cannot
be appraised by government officials because of lack of data, expertise, incentives, or
resources. Costillo, supranote 4, at 349. This distinction is stiiking, but it is not coextensive
with the distinction traditionally drawn by the courts.
"12Accord Crawford & Tschoepe, supra note 20, at 308 n.86; Fischel, supra note 18, at
96, 99.
" To those who argue that our expectations are higher for participants in judicial
proceedings, e.g., Bien, supra note 30, the response is to ask whether our expectations for
those petitioning the legislature are really this low, and, if so, why the law should be
governed by such expectations.
"4 Courts do not and should not lightly probe the secret thinking of government officials,
even if-or perhaps especially if-they are judicial. Formal records may make causation
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challenging restraints caused directly by petitioning. When a plaintiff is
directly injured by a deliberate misrepresentation of fact, why should it
be barred from recovery of damages merely because the misrepresentation occurred in publicity campaigns nominally concerning proposed
legislation?" 15
Although perhaps inadvertently (the Court having restated the familiar legislative-judicial dichotomy'S), Allied Tube intimates that misrepresentations might be considered differently in the future. As
discussed above, restraints resulting from valid governmental action will
enjoy "absolute immunity," but other restraints will be protected only
if "incidental" to "valid" petitioning.' At least in theory, this approach
could protect some misrepresentations formerly subject to challenge (i.e.,
those made to the judiciary), and expose to challenge some misrepresentations formerly protected (i.e., those made to the legislature or
executive).
Some might suggest that the first amendment prevents liability even
for restraints directly caused by such deliberate misrepresentations, but
this view exaggerates the first amendment's reach." 8 The leading freedom of expression cases declare that "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact."" 9 Although these cases protect the vigor of
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at $ 204c, although this will not
always be true, cf. Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorney General of the
United States, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 68,219, at 59,424 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1988)
(rejecting claim that decision was based on ex parte contacts), appeal docketed, No. 88-5286
(D.C. Cir. argument scheduled for Oct. 28, 1988).
" Some defendants may be disadvantaged by the traditional dichotomy. Some phrasings
of that distinction seem to imply that innocent misrepresentations to an adjudicative body
can result in serious antitrust scrutiny. See Sessions, 827 F.2d at 468 ("Where the executive
action sought was more a matter of administering than of making law, misrepresentations
inducing the governmental decision will be actionable in antitrust despite the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.") (citations omitted).
16 Allied Tube qualified the distinction between misrepresentations to the legislature and
the judiciary by suggesting that deliberate misrepresentations under oath during the legislative hearing would not be protected by Noerr. 108 S. Ct. at 1939. The same suggestion
can be found in R. BORK, supra note 21, at 360 ("When the legislature creates a fact-finding
process fashioned after the judicial model-with witnesses, oaths, cross-examination, a
written record, and the like-it becomes correspondingly able to punish deliberate falsehoods and other abuses of its process that would be immune in the regular political arena.").
"7 See supra at text accompanying notes 49-56.
H8
Cf. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1261-62 (9th Cir. 1982) (the first amendment does not protect the predatory furnishing
of false information to an administrative or adjudicative body), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227
(1983)
"I Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974); see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
108 S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988) ("False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere
with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas .... [The necessary] breathing
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debate with appropriately varying standards of care, even with respect
to "public figures" the first amendment does not protect libelous statements of fact made with "malice," i.e., actual knowledge of falsity or
2
reckless disregard for the truth. 1
The right to petition is no broader than the rest of the first amendment.
This was made clear by the Supreme Court's 1985 decision, McDonald
v. Smith.' 2 ' That decision held that there is no absolute immunity for
libelous statements in petitions to the government's executive and (by
copy) legislative branches. 1 22 It must be at least equally applicable to
antitrust. 23 Constitutional protection for competitive harm directly caused
by misrepresentations ought to be no more expansive than the protection
for libelous statements about public figures. 24
space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or
defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement
was made with the requisite level of culpability.").
'2The limitation imposed by the words "of fact" should not be underestimated. The
same cases that state that false statements of fact are valueless declare that the "First
Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108
S. Ct. 876, 880 (1988); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)
("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience ofjudges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.") (footnote omitted).
The distinction between fact and opinion depends on "the totality of the circumstances,"
and is notoriously difficult to discern. See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 989 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (5 of I I judges dissented in part; seven judges issued opinions)
(newspaper columnists' statement that a political science professor "has no status within
the profession, but is a pure and simple activist" is a protected statement of opinion), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
21472 U.S. 479 (1985); see Stanford Note, supra note 13, at 1265-71 (endorsing approach
Court took); cf. Fischel, supra note 18, at 102-03 (advocating use of libel law's "malice"
standard for identifying activities unprotected by Noerr).
122 472 U.S. at 484 ("petitions to the President that contain intentional and reckless
falsehoods 'do not enjoy constitutional protection,' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964), and may ...be reached by the law of libel").
12.Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 83-84 (reading McDonald to say that tort and antitrust
standards should be coterminos). The Sessions court interpreted McDonald as holding that
misrepresentations deliberately made while seeking executive action are not protected
from antitrust exposure. 827 F.2d at 468 n.9. Except to note that McDonald involved
petitioning for executive action, Sessions gave no reason for so limiting McDonald's reasoning
(and, in fact, the allegedly libelous communication in McDonald also had been sent to
legislators). There is no such reason. As the Court said with respect to communications
to the President, "First Amendment rights are inseparable, and there is no sound basis
for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the
President that other First Amendment expressions." 472 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted).
24 Some have suggested that petitioning by businesses for a reduction in competition
should be explicitly regarded as commercial speech, which enjoys only limited constitutional
protection. Note, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Commercial Speech
Interpretation, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 573, 594 (1983) [hereinafter Brooklyn Note] (as is commercial speech, business's petitioning for reductions in competition is "hardy" and "would
thus not be chilled by a requirement of truthfulness"); cf. Balmer, supra note 18, at 5960 (litigation similar to commercial speech); Yale Note, supra note 53, at 841 (Noerrshould
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Nonetheless, one is left with the Noerr opinion and its possible implication that misrepresentations to Congress are absolutely protected. Some
have read Noerr in that fashion." 5 In fact, however, the deception addressed by the Court in Noerr involved "the so-called third-party technique,"' 2 61 that is, arranging to have apparently independent persons
communicate views and information actually prepared by the conspirators.'27 Assertions that falsehoods are protected by the Noerr doctrine
arose later.
Whether falsehoods should be protected depends in part on whether
the Noerr doctrine is founded on constitutional principles or on statutory
interpretation. If it is the former, there is littlejustification for protecting
be narrowed in part because corporate petitioning implicates few first amendment values).
The argument that corporate petitioning is commercial speech goes too far. It would
be an extension of current understanding to include petitioning within commercial speech,
which is most commonly defined as speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction.'" Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328,340 (1986) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978) (rejecting claim that corporations have very limited first amendment rights).
Most authorities would regard petitioning for legislation as political speech, even if' the
motivation is entirely financial. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 7 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) at 59,317 (Silberman, J., concurring) (requests by legal aid lawyers for increased
fees would be political speech), petitionfor rehearingand rehearingen banc, No. 86-1465 (D.C.
Cir. filed Oct. 7, 1988); see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) (participation in the process of selfgovernment is protected). See generally Symposium: CommercialSpeech and the FirstAmendment,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. No. 4 (1988). The most that should be said with respect to genuine
corporate petitioning for governmental action is that there is no reason to be unusually
solicitous of free speech concerns in this context. On the other hand, as the purpose of
ostensible petitioning changes from securing governmental action to injuring competitors
directly, presumably first amendment protections wane. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (struggling to decide whether a brochure promoting a product
and communicating health information was commercial speech).
2I See Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United States Corporate Payments to Foreign
Officials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act and Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 30 VAND. L. REV. 131, 151 (1977) (cases finding Noerr inapplicable to misrepresentations to government officials "appear to conflict with Noerr, in which the Supreme
Court concluded that deliberate deception of public officials, reprehensible as it may be,
is of no Sherman Act consequence"); cf. Allied Tube, 108 S. Ct. at 1936-37 ("unethical and
deceptive methods" are protected when part of a publicity campaign "seeking legislation
or executive action"); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 47 ("at least where the antitrust
plaintiffs have a meaningful opportunity to contest the deliberate misrepresentations or
other improprieties of the defendants, the defendants should incur no liability under the
antitrust laws").
126365 U.S. at 129-30.
17 365 U.S. at 130, 133, 140-41; cf. id. at 133 n.8 ("The District Court did not expressly
find that any particular part of the railroads' publicity campaign was false in its content.
Rather, it found that the technique of the railroads was 'to take a dramatic fragment of
truth and by emphasis and repetition distort it into falsehood.' ") (quoting 155 F. Supp.
at 814).
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deliberate falsehoods that directly cause anticompetitiye harm, whether
the falsehoods are made to Congress, the executive, an administrative
agency, or the judiciary. The question is more challenging if Noerr is
rooted in statutory construction. Even here, understanding is advanced
by recognizing that the first amendment does not protect such statements.
Other than because of first amendment concerns, moreover, why should
deliberate misrepresentations be protected? The most legitimate concern-and it is a serious one-is that harm caused by government action
may be mischaracterized as directly caused harm, thus eviscerating the
right to petition.' 5 The proper response to such a concern, however,
may be to give searching scrutiny to assertions of direct harm, not to
29
protect all misrepresentations to legislative and executive bodies.1
2. Co-ConspiratorException
Disagreement continues over the existence and scope of the "co-conspirator exception."13 The Ninth Circuit has provided two sharply different views. The Sessions court stated that "Noerr-Penningtondoes not
extend to private parties who have entered into a 'conspiracy' with governmental actors."' 3' On the other hand,just six months later a different
Ninth Circuit panel, in Boone, declared that there is no "co-conspirator
'2 There are claims that this occurred in both Allied Tube and Sessions, See supra note 49.
Compare Sessions Tank Lines, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,989,
at 62,067 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("As indicated by plaintiff's own allegations, defendant's lobbying
...brought about plaintiff's injuries precisely because, and only to the extent that, the
recommendations made by those organizations were actually adopted by the governmental
entities.") with Sessions, 827 F.2d at 468-69 (reversing to let plaintiff try to show that
misrepresentations to fire officials acting in administrative capacity caused injury unrelated
to the amending of model code).
" Concerns that baseless claims may support years of burdensome antitrust litigation
ring more hollow now than once was the case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Calkins, supra note 86; see also C.H. Smith
Trucking Co. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 671 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(summary judgment granted for failure to produce evidence of perjury; courts "cannot
rely on suspicions, suggestions and conclusory allegations in opposition to motions for
summary judgment"); cases cited infra note 13.
""See CaliforniaMotor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513 ("Conspiracy with a licensing authority
to eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgression.") (citations omitted);
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671 (Noerr protected successful petitioning of Secretary of Labor
who was "not claimed to be a co-conspirator"). See generally P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 32, at 203.3 (also discussing bribery as part of the co-conspirator exception).
131
827 F.2d at 466 (dictum) (citing Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1252 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983),
and Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564,566 (9th Cir. 1964) ); accord,e.g., Oberndorf
v.City and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 310 (D. Colo. 1986) (illegal conspiracy
not protected), on motion for reconsideration, 653 F. Supp. 312, 313 (D. Colo. 1987) (same);
Englert v. City of McKeesport, 637 F. Supp. 930, 934 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (denying motion
to dismiss).
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exception," and, without mentioning Sessions, said that one of the cases
on which Sessions principally relied had been repudiated.'3 2
Both common sense and intimations in Allied Tube suggest that a
"thoughtful co-conspirator exception" will survive. By itself, "conspiracy," at least in the Sherman Act sense which treats conspiracy interchangeably with agreement,'3 3 is irrelevant. Of course a simple agreement
between a government official or agent and a petitioner should not be
' The question
condemned, lest all successful petitioning bejeopardized. 34
is, or at least should be, whether the government official had some
5
independent, anticompetitive, non-governmental motive to conspire.1
Allied Tube presumably would ask whether the challenged restraint was
imposed by governmental action or by private action; 36 if the latter,
132 841 F.2d at 897 ("In Harman v. Valley National Bank ... we suggested in dicta that
Noerr might not apply if a public official were a participating conspirator in the alleged
agreement to restrain trade. This view, however, was repudiated by Pennington.") (citation
omitted); see alsoJ. Fred Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 15, 1987) (civil rights case applying Noerr) (rejecting exception); Sherman College
of Straight Chiropractic v. American Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
(doubting wisdom of exception), aff'd per curiam, 813 F.2d 349 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 160 (1987).
13 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
"I E.g., Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 265
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ("That a public official is persuaded by the entreaty of a lobbyist does not
make him the lobbyist's co-conspirator."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Woolen v.
Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 344, 354-55 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd per curiam on
basis of lower court opinion, 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987);
cf. Fischel, supra note 18, at 114-15 (urging rejection of exception except where, as in
Continental Ore, purported government official was acting solely as a private actor).
"I Cf. Video Int'l Production, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 7 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,305, at 59,761 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 1988) (judgment n.o.v. for defendant
affirmed where public officials sought to increase city's revenues, not out of "some selfish
or otherwise corrupt motive"); Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. American
Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ("the evidence must show true
complicity"), aff'd per curiam, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 160 (1987).
A useful parallel could be drawn to the "intraenterprise conspiracy" cases finding a plurality
of actors when a corporation's employee or agent has an "independent personal stake" in
accomplishing the objectives of the challenged agreement. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 14 & n.94. Malice, ill will, and bias unrelated to competition
should not be sufficient for liability. Cf. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Munic.pality of Monroeville,
617 F. Supp. 820, 823 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (citizen/councilman's campaign to close landfill at
end of his street protected).
For a related although slightly different standard, see Kintner & Bauer, supra note 2,
at 587 ("the appropriate criteria in determining whether Noerr-Pennington applies would
be whether the government officials also take part in the preliminary steps prior to the
implementation of the conspiracy, and whether the officials act in an essentially private
capacity while wearing a 'government hat.' ").
136 108 S. Ct. at 1938 n.7 (citing "conspiracy" cases as references to its observation that
the line between governmental and private action may be difficult to draw). One of the
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liability should follow. 3 7 The ease of alleging conspiracy makes necessary
the requiring of specificity in pleading, 3 ' but the ability of the courts to
require specificity 13 9 makes possible the preservation of the "exception."
3. Bribery
With wavering precision, courts continue to follow a line generally
tying antitrust exposure for questionable political payments to the legality
of those payments on non-antitrust grounds. 4 ° The Ninth Circuit in
Sessions was untroubled by entertainment and gifts of coffee mugs and
cases cited by the Court, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 370 U.S.
690, 707-08 (1962), provides a stark example: the putative government official actually
was employed by and working for private interests. Cf. Defino v. Civic Center Corp., 718
S.W.2d 505, 512-13 (Mo. App. 1986) (were city to have been part of conspiracy, its
enactment of an ordinance would not break the chain of causation).
This approach is not altogether dissimilar from that taken by courts reasoning that a
finding of conspiracy supports application of the sham exception because it indicates that
others were denied meaningful access to the decision-maker, see, e.g., Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325, 1342 (E.D. Mi. 1986), aff'd per curiam,
849 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1988), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 88-465 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1988); Garst
v. Stoco, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 326, 332 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (citing cases). See generally City
Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 660 F. Supp. 932, 935 & n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(denying summary judgment) (state action exemption would not protect private parties
regulated by a municipality where private parties were the "effective decision makers"),
summary judgment granted upon completion of discovery, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 28, 1988).
"I Allied Tube also would ask whether the plaintiffs had been harmed directly by the
"petitioning" (in which event one might well find liability on the grounds that the petitioning
was invalid), but it seems unlikely that many "conspiracy" cases would involve direct harm.
38 See, e.g., Smith v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,224,
at 59,448 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1988) (affirming summary judgment where "'the plaintiff
has alleged no set of facts' " that would support the conspiracy exception) (opinion not
recommended for full-text publication); Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10876 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 1988) (granting summary judgment where no
evidence supported claim of bribery or conspiracy); Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n,
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 67,953 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 5, 1988) (summary judgment granted
where no specific evidence of conspiracy); Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac,
650 F. Supp. 1325, 1342 (E.D. Mi. 1986) (summaryjudgment granted based on government
officials' sworn denial that adverse decision was result of agreement), aff'd per curiam, 849
F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1988), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 88-465 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1988); P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 203.3e; cf. A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 7
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 68,132 (7th Cir. July 1, 1988) (affirming summary judgment
for counter-defendant where insufficient evidence of conspiracy to lessen competition
other than through protected petitioning).
'" See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd.
of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976) ("in any case ... where a
plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima facie
protected by the First Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will
chill the exercise of First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would
otherwise be required"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); authorities cited supra note 129.
14)See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 203.3c.
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The Ninth Circuit in Boone argued with spirit that

"[p]ayments to public officials, in the form of honoraria or campaign
42
contributions, is a legal and well-accepted part of our political process." 1
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit, in InstructionalSystems Development
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., wrote that "bribery, or misuse or
corruption of governmental processes are outside the protection of the
' 4
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and may give rise to an antitrust claim."' 1
Perhaps most intriguingly, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 4 4 a products
liability case applying Noerr, the court refused to grant a blanket exclusion
of evidence of the tobacco industry's lobbying of Congress. The court
ruled that if "defendants improperly rewarded legislators for their actions in proposing or opposing certain legislation, it is inconceivable that
45
such activity is entitled to first amendment protection."''
In Allied Tube the Supreme Court wrote that it had "never suggested"
that bribery "merits protection" from the antitrust laws. 4' However, the
Court did not make clear the reasoning by which bribery is unprotected.
If the bribery resulted directly in competitive harm, presumably the
Court would consider this to be "invalid" petitioning that does not qualify
for protection. If the bribery resulted in harm only through the action
of a party nominaliy in the government, the Court appears to suggest
that, as with conspiracy, it might conclude that the restraint nonetheless
resulted from private action."'
'l 827 F.2d at 466-67 (treating issue as one of "conspiracy").
42 Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Jose, 841 F.2d 886, 895 (9th Cir.
1988), petition for cert. filed, No. 87-2086 (U.S. May 31, 1988).
143
817 F.2d 639, 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
"4 668 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987).
668 F. Supp. at 410 (denying defendants' motion to exclude all petitioning evidence,
without prejudice to right to object to admissibility at trial). The financial rewards at issue
in Cipollone apparently were "campaign contributions," rather than payments directly to
politicians. The court failed to discuss the possibility that even otherwise lawful campaign
donations may be illegal when given in return for a quid pro quo. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 20 1.
'46108 S.Ct. at 1939 ("one could inmagine situations where the most effective means of
influencing government officials is bribery, and we have never suggested that that kind
of attempt to influence the government merits protection"); seealso id. at 1938 n.7 (noting
that dicta in CaliforniaMotor Transport stated that " 'bribery of a public purchasing agent'
may violate the antitrust laws").
'17
Cf. 108 S. Ct. at 1938 n.7 (citing bribery case as reference to discussion of difficulty
of distinguishing governmental and private action). (For discussion of the unavailability
of the sham exception tinder Allied Tube, see supra at Part B. 1.) This is not to suggest that
it will be easy for a plaintiff to prevail by claiming that financial incentives transformed
what was nominally governmental action into private action. Cf.Campbell v. City of Chicago,
823 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1987) (Flaum, J.)(Noerr applied where the two dominant taxicab
companies agreed to end litigation against the city in return for two near-exclusive franchises, since any injury to competing taxicab companies "stems from the result of the
plaintiffs' successful lobbying efforts, rather than from the lobbying itself," and the lobbying
was not "sham") (citation omitted).
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If campaign donations can cause competitive harm directly (i.e., by
imposing costs on a competitor), the Allied Tube analysis conceivably might
deny Noerr's protection to some campaign donations not otherwise illegal.
Here, also, clarity would be gained by identifying those aspects of Noerr
that are founded on constitutional principles. In Buckley v. Valeo, 48 the
Court upheld congressionally imposed ceilings on the donations individuals may make to candidates. The Court reasoned that relatively little
is communicated by the size of the donation, and first amendment interests are threatened much less by limits on donations to candidates
than by limits on spending to communicate ideas. This distinction suggests that the first amendment might not protect a program of major
campaign donations designed in substantial part (even if not so predominantly as to be sham) to impose costs on a competitor. However, even
if the first amendment does not protect such payments, one might well
conclude that the antitrust laws have little to contribute to the troubled
world of campaign finance law. Prudence dictates at least a strong presumption that Noerr's protection should be coterminous with other legal
standards.
4. Commercial Activity
The issue posed by the controversial "commercial activity" exception
is simple.4' Why should antitrust exposure for anticompetitive conduct
directed at a purchasing agent depend on whether the agent represents
the government or a private party? 5" Government purchases constitute
more than 20 percent of the gross national product,' 5 ' which would make
14424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'4' See generally Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity and ProprietaryGovernment
Activity, 1981 AIz. ST. L.J. 749 (criticizing commercial exception); Indiana Note, supra note
28 (supporting exception).
See, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 3"U.S.P.Q.2d 1042, 1044 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (common-law tort suit; alternative holding) (Noerr would not protect disparaging
letters to government purchasing agency, since government was "a consuming participant
in the general economy," not a "law maker or law enforcer"; "[t]he mere fact that the
object of the correspondence is a government agency is insufficient to elevate what might
otherwise be actionable libel to the level of a constitutional exercise of the right to petition");
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 206 (thoughtful discussion concluding that
there generally should be no special immunity); Kintner & Bauer, supra note 2, at 584
(there should be "some commercial exception"); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to
Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 848 (1968) ("no substantial
reasons to distinguish attempts to influence private commercial conduct ... from efforts
to influence the government in its role as a customer"); cf. Schachar v. American Academy
of Ophthalmology, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 167,986, at 58,052 (N.D. 11. Feb. 25,
1988) (promoting federal sponsorship of research proposal not protected (although participation in study might be): "the underwriting by the government of [this] study does
not constitute the type of government decision making and policy making that the NoerrPennington doctrine was intended to protect").
"ISuperior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 7 Trade Reg. Rep.
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rather severe the exemption of this segment of the economy from antitrust scrutiny. 52 On the other hand, the government is different from
other buyers, and frequently acts with multiple (even conflicting or possibly secret) purposes."' Thus, the military maintains bases to protect
the county but also to help lessen unemployment in parts of the country
that are favored for governmental reasons (whether of public policy or
partisan politics, or both); the government awards procurement contracts
to persons who can supply the product at the best combination of price
(CCH) 68,196, at 59,312 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988) (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 at 410 (108th ed. 1987)), petitionforrehearing
and rehearingen bancfiled, No. 86-1465 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988).
'52Even critics of the "commercial activity" exception would apply antitrust to certain
activity directed against the government. Cf. Greenwood Utilities Comm'n v. Mississippi
Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1505 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J.) (rejecting
exception, but noting that "[i]f a monopolist uses his market power to dictate the terms
of trade to the government ... no legitimate petitioning conduct would be involved," and
adding that "[a]ll would agree that... if as the result of a price fixing agreement by private
parties the government pays more for products it purchases in the marketplace, the
participants in the anticompetitive scheme should not escape liability because of the identity
of the victim"); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 24-26 (criticizing the exception, but
justifying the outcome of the leading "commercial activity" case, George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970),
as a case where a government purchasing official conspired with a seller); Hurwitz, supra
note 20, at 87-88 (arguing against "commercial activity" exception, but saying its abandonment "should be of little consequence" if courts retain "co-conspirator exception" and
"vigorously withhold protection from conduct that is corrupt or vexatious").
"' E.g., Greenwood Utilities, 751 F.2d at 1505 (rejecting exception because "although such
a distinction may be intuitively appealing it proves difficult, if not impossible, of application
in a case such as ours where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same
time acts as a participant in the marketplace"); Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 87 (same); Indiana
Note, supra note 28, at 411. This tension is seen even in the case most frequently cited as
extending Noerr to commercial activities, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965). The desired government activity- requiring the government's coal suppliers
to pay relatively high minimum wages-could be regarded as tangential to a purchasing
decision, or as central to an economic development program; the Court did not give its
understanding. Fischel, supra note 18, at 85.
Several opinions critical of the "commercial" exception can be read as holding that certain
activity is governmental, not commercial. See Bustop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety
Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting of franchise to build bus
shelters, in return for a share of advertising revenue, was governmental); Handler & De
Sevo, supra note 19, at 26 (interpreting In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F.
Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Schwarzer, J.), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1133 (1983), as holding that the granting of an airport franchise is a governmental
activity). This interpretation is not free from doubt, of course; when a city grants a franchise,
it is in effect "buying" a package of services for its citizens (and perhaps fees for its coffers),
in exchange usually for promised exclusivity.
The difficulty of distinguishing "governmental" from "commercial" is reminiscent of
the largely aborted effort to distinguish municipalities' "proprietary activities" from their
"traditional governmental functions" when applying the state action antitrust exemption,
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 422, 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring); See P. AREEDA & H-.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at
212.2d; ANrITRusi LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at
611 n.83.
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and quality, or who will employ the right kinds of people, or who will
provide jobs in the right geographic areas, or who will preserve capacity
needed in anticipation of future government needs, or who will develop
technology useful in eliminating the trade deficit, or for other reasons.
Some cynics might even suggest that city governments are never more
political than when awarding contracts.
Allied Tube, while not directly addressing the issue, lends support to
the commercial activity exception. The factors relied upon to identify
private action-lack of accountability by the decision-maker to the public,
and the presence of financial incentives to restrain competition'S4-counsel in favor of treating petitioning less forgivingly when the government
is acting in a purely commercial capacity.' 55 The Court's pervasive attention to the "context and nature" of challenged activity is consistent
with a willingness to condemn conspiracies directed at the government.,56
Thus, although the "commercial exception" poses a vexing question that
defies easy solutions, at least when the government is acting solely as a
cost-minimizing purchaser or a cost-maximizing seller, the Noerr-Pen5
nington doctrine should provide no special protection.1 1
108 S. Ct. at 1938 (also noting lack of official authority).
'5Allied Tube's discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing private from governmental
action referenced Professors Areeda and Turner's generally supportive discussion of the
commercial exception. 108 S. Ct. at 1938 n.7.
In Superior Court Lawyers, the FTC wrote that the important distinction is not between
"commercial" and "governmental" activity, but rather between the government's role as
victim and as regulator, restrained and restrainer. 107 F.T.C. at 596-99; seealso Michigan
State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (government as target). The Court of Appeals
applied Allied Tube and agreed that Noerr did not protect a well-publicized "boycott" by
the lawyers accepting court appointments for the defense of indigents (although the court
also found that the implication of other first amendment issues required the FTC to find
market power before condemning the boycott, seeinfra Part II.A.). 7 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 68,196 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988), petitionfor rehearingand rehearing en banc filed,
No. 86-1465 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988). The court noted that the government's status as the
target of the boycott made inapposite Allied Tube's concern with whether the restraint was
" 'incidental' to a valid effort to influence governmental action." Instead, the court elevated
Allied Tube's distinction between "commercial" and "political" petitioning, making this the
lodestar by which to evaluate the "context and nature" of a restraint. Id. at 59,309. Finally,
the court upheld the FTC's conclusion "that the boycott was motivated primarily by economic self-interest." Id. at 59,311. Judge Silberman, concurring, argued that the distinction
should not be between "commercial" and "political" petitioning, but rather between prevailing because of coercion and because of persuasion. Id. at 59,317 (Silberman, J., concurring).
111Cf. 108 S. Ct. at 1940 (part of the "context and nature" of the activity was that it "did
not take place in the open political arena"); id. at 1941 ("the antitrust laws should not
necessarily immunize what are in essence commercial activities simply because they have
a political impact").
1"7Accord Fischel, supra note 18, at 115-18; IndianaNote, supra note 28, at 421-24 (burden
should be on plaintiff to prove government was acting in a purely economic capacity); cf.
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 365 ("a court might draw a line between instances where the
15-1
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5. Sham Exception.5
As noted above, Allied Tube has quite clearly and correctly rejected the
amorphous "improper petitioning" view of the "sham" exception to Noerr.
Even as traditionally and now authoritatively defined (i.e., "to cover
activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental action"), however, the sham exception poses difficulties. The diversity of
views is suggested by three recent cases.
In Westmac, Inc. v. Smith,' 59 the Sixth Circuit appeared to rule that
petitioning is not sham unless its only purpose is to harm a third party
directly, i.e., not by the petitioned-for action.' 6 The case arose after a
group of grain elevator operators sought to block a competitor's attempt
to obtain tax-favored bond financing for a new elevator facility. The
defendants attended and spoke at public hearings on the matter but
failed to prevent administrative approval of the plan. Prior to the final
administrative decision, one of the defendants instructed his lawyer that
if the lobbying failed, " 'start a lawsuit-bonds won't sell.' """1 The defendants subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the financing
program in state court and, although their lawsuit failed at the trial court
and on appeal, apparently succeeded in blocking sale of the bonds. The
plaintiff's antitrust suit challenged the defendants' filing of the state
court suit.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed an award of summary judgment to the
defendants. It ruled that the issue was whether the plaintiffs (in the state
court suit) were "indifferent to obtaining a favorable judgment."' 62 The
court further held "that when a lawsuit raises a legal issue of genuine
substance, it raises a rebuttable presumption that it is a serious attempt
government actor is performing some regulatory function, however minimal, and those
when it is performing none").
I" See generally Balmer, supra note 18; Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 93-125.
IMI 797 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1987).
"' See also Sullivan, supra note 2, at 362 (activity "is not a sham ...unless petitioner is
really not looking for government action at all," which "does not mean that a petitioner
cannot have other collateral, or even another primary goal"); Handler, Twenty-Five Years
of Antitrust (Twenty-Fifth Annual Antitrust Review), 73 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 436 (1973) ("The
sham exception applies only where the defendant is not really seeking to elicit government
action at all.").
l1, 797 F.2d at 318.
" 797 F.2d at 318. The court also wrote as follows:
[T]he sham exception is a "narrow one" and "is applicable when the activity in
question corrupts governmental processes to such an extent that it constitutes
access barring conduct of the sort described in CaliforniaMotor." ..."[T]he key
to the 'sham exception' is an improper interference with governmental process."
797 F.2d at 318 (quoting Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484,
487 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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to obtain a judgment on the merits instead of a mere sham or harass''
ment."
According to the court, the plaintiff had failed to overcome
that presumption even to raise a triable issue: "It defies common sense
1 4
to suggest defendants did not seek a favorable judgment.""
At the other extreme is PremierElectrical Construction Co. v. National
Electrical Contractors Association, Inc.'65 In that case Judge Easterbrook
embellished the test Judge Posner had offered in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois
Tool Works, Inc. 166 as follows:
We elaborated further in [Grip-Pak], holding that a suit brought only
because of the costs litigation imposes on the other party also may fit
the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. We explained,
id. at 472: "many claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on
for their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning,
would be too low to repay the investment in litigation." If the expected
value of aj udgment is $10,000 (say, a 10% chance of recovering $100,000),
the case is not "groundless"; yet if it costs $30,000 to litigate, no rational
plaintiff will do so unless he anticipates some other source of benefit.
If the other benefit is the costs litigation will impose on a rival, allowing
7
an elevation of the market price, it may be treated as a sham. '
In other words, a lawsuit is sham unless it would be cost-justified for a
disinterested litigant.
Finally, the most intriguing case is In re Burlington Northern, Inc. "68 This
was an extraordinary decision, and is important in several respects. It
arose out of a discovery skirmish in the war between the coal slurry
pipeline interests and the railroads. The railroads resisted turning over
certain litigation papers, claiming attorney-client privilege; the pipeline
interests asserted the "crime/fraud exception;" the railroads claimed Noerr
protected their litigation and sought a writ of mandamus. The issue was
joined; its resolution, according to the Fifth Circuit, turned on the sham
exception. 6"
" Id. at 318. Professor Handler would go even further: "Only an attempt to petition
the government that is plainly foreclosed as a matter of law or is otherwise frivolous, and
which the petitioner instigated knowing that it lacked any factual or legal bases, should
subject the defendant to antitrust liability." Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 55
(emphasis added).
TM
Id. at 319 n.9.

814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.),followed, A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v.
Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 681, 696 (1988).
"'694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
"17814 F.2d at 372 (lawsuit not sham because brought to win, although not protected
since brought to enforce illegal cartel).
"" 822 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988).
"r,822 F.2d at 533-34 ("Even if prior litigation was part of an overall conspiracy which
itself violated antitrust law, Noerr-Pennington requires a prima facie finding that the particular litigation was a sham to warrant discovery of documents initially protected by the
attorney/client privilege or work product immunity.").
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The pipeline interests challenged the defendants' roles in two kinds
of litigation. The first was a lawsuit brought by three states, several
environmental groups, and one railroad, seeking to invalidate a water
contract between the pipeline interests and the U.S. Department of the
Interior. The plaintiffs had prevailed in the two decisions issued in that
lawsuit as of the date of Burlington Northern, and later prevailed in the
Supreme Court. 7 ' The second was a series of lawsuits brought by the
pipeline interests against various railroads seeking to establish a pipeline
owner's right, as owner of a (purchased) easement, to cross rail lines.
The pipeline interests alleged that the railroads resisted these suits and
sought discovery even though they "knew that they had no viable defense," in order to delay the pipeline project and obtain information for
7
use in other forums.' '
The broadest importance of BurlingtonNorthern stems from its teaching
about the standards for identifying sham petitioning. It held that litigation is sham if it "was undertaken without a genuine desire for judicial
relief as a significant motivating factor, or if there was no reasonable
expectation of judicial relief, or if there was no reasonable basis for a
party's standing."'' 72 (This last possibility referred to one railroad's quietly
lending assistance to a state that was a plaintiff in the suit against the
Department of the Interior.) The Court also held that even litigation
that ultimately succeeds (i.e., the lawsuit against the Department of the
74
Interior) can be sham, 173 and that even defending lawsuits can be sham. 1
A vigorous petition for certiorari was denied. 75 In the petition, the
railroads urged the Supreme Court to adopt an objective, bright line
standard: "in the absence of fraud or collusion with the court, successful
litigation cannot be a sham."'176 There is substantial support for this view
(including dicta in Allied Tube), 177 but there also is substantial contrary
170Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1986), aff'd sub nom. ETSE Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 (1988). As of the
date of Burlington Northern, certiorari had been granted. 107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987).
17'

822 F.2d at 532.

172822

F.2d 518, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701

(1988).
171Id. at 534.
174822 F.2d at 532-33 ("We perceive no reason to apply any different standard to
defending lawsuits than to initiating them.").
'15

108 S. Ct. 701 (1988).

Petition for Certiorari at 11; see also id. at i (first "question presented").
177 See Greenwood Utilities Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1500 (5th
Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J.); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 30); Sullivan, supra
note 2, at 364 (if petitioner won or even demonstrated merit, a court usually should grant
summaryjudgment in its favor); cf.Allied Tube, 108 S. Ct. at 1938 ("The effort to influence
,'76
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authority. 178 Even some of those who believe that success is an important
consideration would let it erect only a strong presumption, 179 and this
seems the better view (and, indeed, the view adopted by Burlington
80
Northern1 ).

The success of challenged petitioning is an issue principally because
it proves or at least strongly suggests that the petitioning was not "baseless."
Some courts and commentators have argued that only baseless suits
should be sham 8 ' and this was the thesis of the Burlington Northern
governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized as a sham given the
actual adoption of the 1981 [model] Code in a number of statutes (sic) and local ordinances.").
' Sessions Tank Liners, 827 F.2d at 465 n.5 (success "is not dispositive"); G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1476-77 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (success
creates strong but rebuttable inference); Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C.
510, 593 (1986) ("The First Amendment right to petition the government does not include
the right to be effective."), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
68,196 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988), petitionfor rehearingand rehearingen bancfiled, No. 861565 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988); Fischel, supra note 18, at 111 n.160 ("the success of the
petitioning activity should not be dispositive: lobbying activity characterized by abusive
tactics should not enjoy antitrust immunity even if successful"); Kintner & Bauer, supra
note 2, at 576 ("even a claim on which the defendant prevailed may be the basis for loss
of petitioning immunity through application of the sham exception") (citing cases).
The tort of malicious prosecution normally requires "[tiermination of the proceeding
in favor of the accused." E.g., W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 871 (5th ed. 1984). For the leading authority arguing
that this should be applied by analogy in Noerr cases, see Note, Limiting the AntitrustImmunity

for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious
Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715, 727-31 (1973). Contra, e.g., Cornell
Note, supra note 18, at 1321 n.114.
171See, e.g., Smith v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
68,224,
at 59,448 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1988) (affirming summary judgment where defendant instigated a prosecutor's search of plaintiffs' residence that led to plaintiffs' guilty pleas) (opinion
not recommended for full-text publication), relying on Potters Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 1986) (conclusion that efforts to persuade state to
deny capital spending reimbursement certification was not sham was "reinforced by the
very fact that its [defendant's] position prevailed"); ClipperExxpress, 690 F.2d at 1254 ("while
success or failure ...is not singularly determinative of a party's intent, this Circuit regards
such success or failure as indicative of a party's intent"); see also Hurwitz, supra note 20,
at 108-09 (strong presumption). Professor Areeda, who was of counsel for the plaintiffs
in their successful effort to persuade the Supreme Court to deny certiorari in Burlington
Northern, has written that "a successful judicial action is not a 'sham,' regardless of the
motive of the plaintiff in that action," P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMp, supra note 32, at 19,
but advocates this as "merely a strong presumption," in order to recognize the possibilities
of serious misuse of discovery, a wrongly decided principal case, and possible conspiracy
with the decision-maker, id. at 21.
0 E.g., 822 F.2d at 527 ("success on the merits is forceful evidence that the petitioner
did in fact wish to influence the governmental decision and obtain the relief prayed for").
1S E.g., Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 13; see Omni Resource Development Corp.
v. Conoco, Inc., 739 F.2d 1412, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1984); Sherman College of Straight
Chiropractic v. American Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 723-24 (N.D. Ga. 1986),
aff'd per curiam, 813 F.2d 349 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 160 (1987); see also Balmer,
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petition for certiorari.' 82 As had the concurring opinion in Burlington
Northern, the petition relied heavily on Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB. 83 In BillJohnson's, the Court held that the NLRB can enjoin only
suits brought with a retaliatory motive and lacking a reasonable basis. 184
The Court wrote that California Motor Transport "recognized that the
right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right
to petition the Government for redress of grievances," and the Court
"should be sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the
5
NLRA.",

BillJohnson'scan be cited fairly for the proposition that the first amendment may be implicated when aggrieved parties are enjoined from filing
lawsuits. The case should not be read to support a constitutional right
supra note 18, at 68 & n.137 (denying that showing of baselessness is constitutionally
required, but somewhat tentatively suggesting a required showing that suit was brought
without probable cause).
Attention to "baselessness" originated with CaliforniaMotor Transport, where the Court
wrote as follows: "One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed;
but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude
that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused." 404 U.S. at 513; cf Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) (in CaliforniaMotor Transport
"we held that the principle of Noerr may also apply to the use of administrative or judicial
processes where the purpose to suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits
carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus is within the 'mere sham' exception").
The difficulty of interpreting these declarations is that Justice Douglas was writing illustratively, not prescriptively. It is doubtful that the Court meant to hold either that a single
suit cannot be a sham or that a suit that is not baseless cannot be a sham. See infra note
189; cf. Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 28-30 (most courts have eliminated any
multiplicity requirement); Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 101 (same).
,42Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-22 (offering a choice between circuits that assertedly employed an "objective" standard focusing on the merits of the petitioning (Third,
Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), and ones that assertedly employed a "subjective"
standard similar to the Burlington Northerncourt's "substantial motivating factor" approach
(Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits).
'" 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
'8 The Bill Johnson's Court also wrote, in dicta, that litigation proven to be meritorious
(by success) "is not an unfair labor practice." 461 U.S. at 747.
,, 461 U.S. at 741 (citing CaliforniaMotor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510, where the Court
wrote that "the right of petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right
of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." (citations omitted));
see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984) (BillJohnson's"stressed that
the right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment
right to petition the government") (dictum; case ruled that it was an unfair labor practice
for an employer to request an Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation of
employees solely because they supported a union).
The right of access to courts also has been addressed by a line of cases initially concerned
with associational rights to seek legal services, N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, (1963),
that was extended to include a right to take collective action to secure effective and
economical counsel, United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576,
585 (1971) (Black, J.) ("collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment").
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to file unlimited non-baseless suits. The case involved an interpretation
of the National Labor Relations Act, not (directly) an interpretation of
the Constitution. s6 Moreover, the decision turned in part on issues of
federalism: the Court recognized "the States' compelling interest in the
maintenance of domestic peace ...[by] providing a civil remedy for
conduct touching interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' "87 Issues of federalism were implicated because the NLRB had
ordered the withdrawal of a lawsuit filed in state court. It is significant,
moreover, that the Court ruled that the NLRB miay find that an unsuccessful lawsuit filed with retaliatory intent is an unfair labor practice,
even if the lawsuit had a reasonable basis.' 88 Finally, it would be difficult
to reconcile a constitutional right to file non-baseless lawsuits with earlier
Noerr cases, particularly CaliforniaMotor Transport, which found that even
89
a series of lawsuits that substantially succeeded could be sham. The
""See Burlington Northern, 822 F.2d at 528-29 n.7 (limiting case to labor law); see also
Stanford Note, supra note 13, at 1261.
"17461 U.S. at 741 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1959); see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897-98 (1984) (citing lack of
federalism concerns to support decision not to apply Bill Johnson's).
461 U.S. at 749:
(If the state proceedings result in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff, the Board
may then consider the matter further and, if it is found that the lawsuit was filed
with retaliatory intent, the Board may find a violation and order appropriate
relief. In short, then, although it is an unfair labor practice to prosecute an
unmeritorious lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose, the offense is not enjoinable unless
the suit lacks a reasonable basis.).
Hurwitz argues that Bill Johnson's conclusion that substantial lawsuits can be illegal should
be limited to the labor context, Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 104-05, but this distinguishing
is unpersuasive. There is no more reason to protect litigation when interpreting the Labor
Act than when interpreting the Sherman Act. Hurwitz argues that risks are lower in the
labor context, since only an agency can sue, but that should not determine whether the
Constitution protects non-baseless litigation. Moreover, until and unless one can compare
the relative importance of enforcement of the two statutes, one cannot conclude that
unsuccessful litigation should be protected from the antitrust laws but not labor law.
" Cf ClipperExxpress, 690 F.2d at 1257 (interpreting "baseless" to include administrative
protests "filed automatically and without regard to merit," although the protests at issue
were unsuccessful). The CaliforniaMotor Transport complaint had alleged the initiation of
proceedings " 'with or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits.'" 404 U.S. at
512. The district court found the sham exception to be inapplicable because the complaint
"did not allege that the presentations defendants made to the agencies and the courts were
in themselves false, misleading, or lacking in evidentiary or legal support." CaliforniaMotor
Transport, 432 F.2d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 1970). The court of appeals ruled that "[s]ince all
applications were to be opposed, it is irrelevant that a valid basis existed for opposing some
applications." Id. at 762-63. The Supreme Court affirmed. Cf. Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (suit not sham
"because there is no evidence that the suit was brought in bad faith, to harass, or in any
way such that it would not be immune"); Disensos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work,
676 F. Supp. 1254, 1286 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (suit not sham where not "brought in bad faith
or without probable cause or to harass").
One of the more serious efforts to reconcile Bill Johnson's and other Noerr cases was by
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Court would not lightly change such settled law. And having not found
a right to file non-baseless suits in the Constitution, courts probably
should not find it in the Sherman Act. " '
Were it feasible, there would be good reason for Noerr-Pennington law
to move increasingly toward an objective test for evaluating the sham
exception.' 9' It is troubling to have such major decisions turn on subjective intent, particularly in an age when an intent standard may serve
merely to reward those who use good counsel effectively. Particularly
troubling are those opinions that rely exclusively on subjective intent
and then respond to concerns about excessive liability by placing heavy
burdens on the plaintiff to prove bad faith, with varying degrees of
particularity.' 92 The problem, of course, is the difficulty of identifying
a satisfactory yet entirely objective test.
Westmac and Premier Electrical each offer objective tests.' Westmac's
very strong presumption that litigation raising a substantial question is
not sham probably goes too far.' 4 If, as the court suggested, petitioning
is sham only where the petitioner is indifferent about the outcome, it is
Hurwitz. Without much support in Bill Johnson's, he interpreted that opinion to provide
that only petitioning lacking a reasonable basis (and, if decided, being unmeritorious) can
be a sham unless the petitioning is "unethical, part of a larger unlawfully anticompetitive
scheme, or ...undertaken in complete disregard of the merits." Hurwitz, supra note 20,
at 102-05 (citations omitted).
1 Courts are increasingly disenchanted with the amount of litigation, see infra note 196,
and seem unlikely to become more protective of rights to sue. Why protect lawsuits filed
without regard to the merits, or lawsuits filed solely to impose litigation costs on defendants,
or to discover information for use unrelated to the litigation?
"9See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 203. lc (objective test is needed);
cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("excessive disruption of government"
should be avoided by relying on the "objective reasonableness" of a government official's
actions to decide whether the official has violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
"I See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of complaint
alleging agreement "to oppose, repeatedly, baselessly and in bad faith, the granting of
building permits ...for the construction of McDonald's restaurants"), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
940 (1977); cf.G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1476
(E.D. Wis. 1987) (sham exception "often involves questions of motive or subjective intent";
"plaintiffs must prove the defendant's bad faith by clear and convincing evidence"). Compare
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th Cir.), (jury instructions
had required proof of sham by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983) with Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 813-14 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
only preponderance of evidence is required), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
113 Handler & De Sevo argue that the Grip-Pak standard turns on "intent" and "has alnost
guaranteed that each case will be submitted to a jury." Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19,
at 39. This seems incorrect. Judge Posner's formula may be difficult to apply, but it is
designed to be applied consistently regardless of the mental process of the defendant.
94 But cf. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 203. 1c (appearing to endorse
Westmac approach).
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difficult to imagine a sham. Most litigants would have at least a sporting
interest in winning.' 5 With courts becoming increasingly intolerant of
vexatious litigation,' 6 it seems unlikely that such a permissive standard
will survive.
The difficulties posed by PremierElectrical'scost-justification standard
have been well catalogued.1 7 Nonetheless, the formula offers insight: to
determine whether petitioning is being done for impermissible reasons,
ask what the hypothetical reasonably prudent firm would do.' 98 The
court's model is flawed because it ignores what could be considered
legitimate "externalities" of commercial litigation. A reasonable firm might
bring a meritorious trademark infringement suit to establish the validity
of its claim or to demonstrate its resolve to enforce its rights, even though
that particular suit would not be "profitable." This is permitted. So also,
as Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest, it might be permissible
to collect a debt from a competitor even when the expenses were such
that the creditor would not have collected it from another firm.' 99 What
is not permitted-or should not be permitted-is to bring a lawsuit, to
use the Seventh Circuit's phrasing, "only because of the costs litigation
imposes on the other party. 2 0 0 A better operational question than the
one asked by Premier Electrical would be whether a reasonable firm in
the defendant firm's market position would have invested the expected
litigation costs in order to win the expected value of the judgment,
'95
See Yale Note, supra note 53, at 837.
""'Judicial intolerance is most noticeable in the increasingly tough application of Rule
II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for violations of which sanctions are becoming
commonplace. See Calkins, supra note 86, at 1105-06 n.288; Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standardsfor Rule II Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987); cf. Balmer, supra
note 18, at 68-69 (describing the developing law of sanctions as a "fruitful source of
assistance in determining what is a sham suit").
'I7Professor Handler has written that "it is difficult to conceive of an opinion more at
war with Noerr than Grip-Pak." Handler & De Sevo, supra note 19, at 36. Professors Areeda
and Hovenkamp argue that the Grip-Pak court's reasoning "seems very speculative." P.
AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP,

supra note 32, at $ 203.1 They criticize Grip-Pak as overlooking

"that injury to rivals and the suppression of competition is an altogether proper purposeindeed, the very purpose-of legal process to prevent appropriation of trade secrets or
infringement of patents." Hurwitz objects to Grip-Pak because he asserts that "it is virtually
impossible to forecast either a suit's potential rewards or its costs," and notes that a litigation
may offer "legitimate strategic and psychological benefits." Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 107.
This overstates the case a little, since litigation costs increasingly are estimated, but the
concern is valid.
"' Not all commentators are hostile. The Grip-Pak test was endorsed as "the soundest
test" by Kintner and Bauer, who quoted with approval the following: " 'The line is crossed
when [the defendant's] purpose is not to win a favorable judgment against a competitor
but to harass him, and deter others, by the process itself-regardless of outcome-of
litigating.' " Kintner & Bauer, supra note 2, at 573.

P.

""

AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP,

supra note 32, at

203.1

PremierElectrical Construction Co., 814 F.2d at 372.

2""

19881

ANTITRUST AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

including any legitimate "externalities," but not including the benefit of
2
imposing litigation expenses on the defendant. '
The most sensible course would be to use the objective standards of
Westmac and PremierElectrical as thresholds that would establish a prima
facie case of sham. In other words, a plaintiff would meet its burden of
going forward by showing that challenged petitioning lacked a reasonable
basis, or was not cost-justified as described above. That done, the burden
of going forward (or perhaps even of proof, where challenged petitioning
lacked a reasonable basis) would shift to the defendant to introduce
evidence of its intent. For the ultimate standard, however, it is difficult
to improve upon the (admittedly subjective) standard traditionally used
by the Fifth Circuit, which was reiterated in part in Burlington Northern:
Noerr is applicable to litigation "so long as a genuine desire for judicial
'112
relief is a significant motivating factor underlying the suit.
6. Noerr's "Penumbra"
With a notable exception, courts have continued to be unimpressed
by what I refer to as the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine's "penumbra." Defendants regularly invoke Noerr's constitutional overtones to argue that
petitioning activity carries with it a general immunizing quality. Courts
have shown some ability to resist these expansionist invitations. Although
not certain, Allied Tube should not change this.
201This approach would not credit the "psychological benefits" of litigation mentioned
by Hurwitz. However, bringing lawsuits out of personal spite unrelated to competitive
harm should not violate the antitrust laws; proof of this motivation should prevent antitrust
liability.
12 Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983),followed,
Burlington Northern, 822 F.2d at 527; accord G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1476 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (adding that "the issue of intent that controls
is whether the litigant wished to obtain its anticompetitive end through obtaining courtordered relief or simply through the filing and maintenance of the lawsuit"); Woolen v.
Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 344, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd per curiam on basis
of lower court opinion, 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987). Indeed,
even after advocating objective standards, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp conclude
by saying that "[plerhaps we cannot hope to be more precise" than this. P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 24.
In addition to requiring that interest in prevailing was a substantial motivating factor,
Burlington Northern required a reasonable expectation of judicial relief. 822 F.2d at 534;
accord G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1476 (E.D.
Wis. 1987). Professors Areeda and -lovenkamp also believe it is unnecessary to protect
the honest assertion of an unreasonable claim, explaining that "it seems wise policy to hold
business actors to a standard of reasonable care in using governmental machinery." P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 17. This analysis begs the question. Rule 11
charges all litigants to use care before filing complaints; the issue is whether also to threaten
antitrust liability. Although it is a close call, I would prefer to protect from antitrust exposure
the genuinely good faith assertion of even groundless claims.
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The threat posed by Noerr's "penumbra" can be seen in an exception
to the pattern. This was the questionable decision by the Tenth Circuit
in Bright v. Moss Ambulance Service, Inc. 20 3 In that case an ambulance
company enjoying an exclusive franchise in Ogden City, Utah, allegedly
employed predatory acts to expand its market share in the surrounding
county. 2°4 The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the
defendant solely based on the plaintiff's failure to create an issue of fact
on the existence of market or monopoly power: 20 5 "We have held that
Moss' conduct in obtaining and enforcing its franchise is immune from
the antitrust statutes [under Noerr]. Therefore, its enjoyment of the
market share devolved from the protected activity cannot support allegations of market power. '20 6 The court excluded the defendant's op207
erations in Ogden City, when computing market and monopoly power.
The court showed excessive deference to Noerr. To be sure, there is
nothing illegal about defendants' requesting an exclusive franchise, but
that is all that Noerr's "immunity" requires. Just as a lawfully obtained
patent monopoly may be misused in a manner violative of Sherman Act
Section 2,208 so also monopoly power lawfully obtained through petitioning activity should be subject to Sherman Act Section 2. Whether
the monopoly in Ogden City resulted from a patent, a superior product,
an exclusive franchise, or any other source, the Sherman Act applies if
the defendant has sufficient power and Section 2's conduct element is
20 9

satisfied.

F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1987) (Moore, J.).
The allegedly predatory acts included responding to a sheriff's policy of summoning
the geographically closest ambulance by locating an ambulance station immediately adjacent
to the plaintiff's. Much of the plaintiff's suit apparently had been devoted to challenging
the defendant's (Noerr-protected) efforts to obtain and enforce the franchise. 824 F.2d at
822 & n.4.
205 The court explained that "monopoly power" is required for the offense of monopolization, and "market power" is usually required for the offense of attempted monopolization. The court did not define market power, but said that it "requires a lesser showing
than is necessary to establish monopoly power." 824 F.2d at 824 n.5. Bright is not the first
court to struggle with these concepts. See Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and
Access (Part1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 275, 294-301 (1987).
2 824 F.2d at 824.
203824
2'

207

Id.

2 8 See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 94 (1977) ("thrust upon"

defense applies only "if the firm does not engage in market conduct which has the purpose
or effect of protecting, enhancing or extending its power").
0"Of course, saying that the court should not have relied on Noerr to grant summary
judgment for want of an issue of market power does not mean that the plaintiff should
have prevailed. To this observer, the defendant's "dirty tricks," see supranote 204, resemble
vigorous competition more than anything else. But that was not the issue before the Bright
court.
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Happily, Bright is an exception. Three notable counter-examples come
from the Seventh Circuit.2 10 In Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. In-

ternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers,21' the court, in an opinion by
Judge Easterbrook, held that the constitutionally protected right to file
a lawsuit does not immunize an illegal agreement subsequently enforced
by a lawsuit. 21 2 In A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Inc.,'"3 the court reminded

us that Noerr's protection of the petitioning of Congress to make unlawful
the unauthorized renting of records offers no protection for any subsequent agreements to den), such authorization. And in Hospital Corporationof America v. Federal Trade Commission,2 1 4 the court enforced an FTC
order against a merger, observing that although hospitals are free to
petition government agencies to lessen competition through the certificate of need process, the FTC and a court are free to consider this
potential anticompetitive activity when evaluating a merger's likely competitive effect. Finally, the Third Circuit, in PennsylvaniaDentalAssociation
v. Medical Service Association of Pennsylvania"5 held that a group of dentists'
"associational interests" did not justify what was in effect a boycott of an
insurance company's "balance billing" plan.
Questions about the scope of Noerr's protection frequently arise in
evidentiary disputes. Here there is reason to be sensitive to Noerr's concerns, since juries and judges learning of evidence admitted on one issue
may not be able to cabin their knowledge. The uniformly accepted standard establishes that evidence of petitioning activity that is not illegal
under the antitrust laws nevertheless may be admitted for proof of motive
or intent, provided that any prejudicial effect does not outweigh the
probative value of the evidence.2 1 6 One court has ruled that Noerr-pro21

1 See also J. Fred Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191
(N.D. I11.
Jan. 15, 1987) (civil rights case applying Noerr) (refusing to dismiss counts also alleging
conduct other than protected petitioning activity).
211 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.).
212 Quite a different situation would be presented were a city's exclusive franchisee to
complain about violations of the franchise ordinance's exclusivity provisions. See G. Fruge
Junk Co. v. City of Oakland, 637 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. Calif. 1986) (Schwarzer, J.)
(complaints protected).
213 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
68,132, at 58,910-911 (7th Cir. July 1, 1988) (Flaum, J.)
(dictum) (accepting plaintiff's theory arguendo, but affirming summary judgment for
defendant for want of evidence of conspiracy).
214807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied. 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
215 815 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 153 (1987).
211 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670-71 n.3 ("It would of course still be within the province
of the trial judge to admit this [Noerr-protected] evidence, if he deemed it probative and
not unduly prejudicial .. .if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the
particular transactions under scrutiny."); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); see also
United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1373-75 (2d Cir. 1988); Schachar
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tected evidence is "presumptively prejudicial. ' 21 7 Not all courts agree
with this, however, 2" and one court ruled that any such presumption
would be "inappropriate" where the petitioning was "ethically questionable. '2' 9 Thus, even petitioning activity that qualifies for protection under
Noerr is not wholly without antitrust risk.
In Bright the court extended the "penumbra" of Noerr-Penningtontoo
far, but Bright was an exception. The pattern is jeopardized somewhat
by Allied Tube's repeated, rather casual references to the Noerr doctrine
as conferring "immunity," since, as apparently happened in Bright, notions of "immunity" may fuel expansionist arguments. The pattern also
is jeopardized somewhat by the Court's failure to identify the aspects of
Noerr (if any) that are creatures only of statutory interpretation, 220 since
doctrines that are founded on constitutional principles may be applied
relatively aggressively. Nonetheless, Allied Tube's careful disaggregation
of Noerr's several aspects offers hope that new claims for expansive protection will be critically received.
v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
67,986, at
58,052 (N.D. I1. Feb. 25, 1988).
217 United States Football League v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);on
appealfromjury verdict, 842 F.2d 1335, 1373-75 (2d Cir. 1988) (lobbying evidence properly
excluded; no mention of presumption); cf. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1481 (D. Wyo. 1987) (Noerr "bars" evidence of a threat
to intervene in a FERC proceeding); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp.
440, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (inferring predatory intent from protected activity would be
illogical and would infringe on first amendment rights). For the argument that all Noerrprotected evidence should be excluded, see, e.g., Fischel, supra note 18, at 121 (emphasizing
first amendment rationale of doctrine). For the argument that such evidence should be
presumptively excluded, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supranote 32, at 203.7 (stressing
"logical infirmity" of such evidence).
211 Cf. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
67,986, at 58,052 (N.D. I11.Feb. 25, 1988) (no mention of any presumption). In Consolidated Gas Co. of Florida, Inc. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987), a
monopolization suit, the court permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the defendant's opposition of plaintiff's application for a license from FERC. The plaintiff claimed
this evidence helped show a pattern of anticompetitive activity. The court explained its
ruling as follows:
Whether the Noerr-Pennington defense is applicable or not, two facts are clear:
first, Consolidated [the plaintiff] was severely damaged by the delay which occurred as a direct result of City Gas' [the defendant's] intervention; and, second,
City Gas' reason for opposing Consolidated's application was to protect its own
domain. Thus, although we do not hold that City Gas' intervention in the FERC
proceeding violated § 2, we believe evidence of City Gas' motives are derived from
its officers' statements regarding Consolidated's application.
665 F. Supp. at 1542 (citation to record omitted).
211 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 408,411 (D.N.J. 1987) (products liability
case). The lobbying allegedly had involved misrepresentations and financial rewards for
legislative action. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.

See supra Part B.4.

221)
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D.

NOERR-PENNINGTON CONCLUSION

For many years courts have struggled through the "quagmire" of the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., the Supreme Court has contributed an important opinion that offers
uncertain guidance but that contains a structure that ultimately may
contribute to greater clarity. The important concept of "valid" petitioning
is inadequately explained, and the implications of Allied Tube for private
standard-setters are ambiguous and await further developments. This
uncertainty should not eclipse the Court's important "disaggregation"
of the Noerr doctrine. The Court distinguished between harm caused by
governmental action and harm caused by petitioning, between governmental and private action, and between petitioning that is not genuinely
intended to influence governmental action (which is "sham") and activity
that is merely unethical (which is not). Still greater clarity would have
resulted from an identification of the aspects of the Noerr doctrine that,
are based only on statutory interpretation and not the Constitution.
Consideration of Allied Tube in light of recent developments suggests
that the Court's approach conceivably could rewrite the "black letter"
law concerning misrepresentation, with the key distinction shifting from
the nature of the body to which misrepresentations are directed to the
source of the restraint (i.e., governmental action or the petitioning itself).
Similarly, the "commercial" exception is likely to be retained, but the
"bribery" and "co-conspirator" exceptions may be recast as instances
where the restraint does not stem from true governmental action. The
"sham" exception should turn on the extent to which petitioning is significantly motivated by an interest in governmental action. Finally, the
pattern of cases according Noerr only a narrow "penumbra" may continue, although this is not free from doubt. For each of these issues,
indeed, the resolution is uncertain, and may remain so until the Court
finally determines the extent to which Noerr rests on constitutional principles.
II. OTHER CASES BALANCING COMPETITION
AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Noerr is only the principal focus of tension between the antitrust and
freedom of expression.2" Two important recent cases resolved that tension without relying on Noerr. Ironically, the first decisions in each case
were written by former FTC Administrative Law Judge Morton Needelman. As of this writing each case is on appeal.
22

See generally Sullivan, First Amendment Defenses in Antitrut Litigation, 46 Mo. L. REV.

517 (1981).
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SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

After this paper was delivered, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit decided Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association v.
Federal Trade Commission,22 a case that all would agree is difficult. The
case has already produced three lengthy, thoughtful opinions, each
adopting a different approach-and the case is not yet over.
The respondents' position was highly sympathetic. Relatively low paid
attorneys who regularly accept court appointments to represent-indigent
criminal defendants had engaged in a well-publicized "strike" to pressure
the District of Columbia government to increase legal fees, with the
apparent tacit endorsement of the city government. 223 FTC Administrative Law Judge Needelman had issued an initial decision finding that
the antitrust laws prohibit such boycotts as this and that no recognized
exemption applied. Nonetheless, he dismissed the complaint because the
District had been "so supportive" of the boycott.2 24 "[W]hen the seller's
action is accompanied by the buyer's knowing wink, this suggests that
presumptions about the way free markets work ... should be saved for
' 5
another day. 22
The FTC reversed Judge Needelman and condemned the boycott as
illegal per se and illegal under a "truncated rule of reason. '226 Although
conceding that District officials were sympathetic to the criminal defense
lawyers, the Commission rejected his finding that the District had supby
ported the boycott. 2 7 The Commission also ruled that any blessing
228
District officials could not immunize an otherwise illegal boycott.
1 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,196 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1988), petition for rehearingand
rehearing en banc filed, No. 86-1465 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1988). Where relevant to the Noerr
discussion above, this case has already been mentioned. For an earlier discussion of the
case, see Sullivan, supra note 2, at 366-67.
2 I d. at 59,315 n.35 ("The record demonstrates that Mayor Barry and other important
city officials were sympathetic to the boycotters' goals and may even have been supportive
of the boycott itself.") (citations omitted); see also 107 F.T.C. at 560 (initial decision).
211107 F.T.C. at 561 ("[T]he boycott was viewed by city officials as the only feasible way
of getting a rate increase, which was unpopular with the general public but was supported
by virtually all elements of the community concerned with implementing the public policy
behind the Sixth Amendment.").
"1 107 F.T.C. at 560.

226101 F.T.C. 510 (1986) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r).
22 107 F.T.C. at 578. The Commission's conclusion that the District did not support the
boycott was based on the city council's failure to increase legal fees prior to the boycott.
This does not address the respondents' argument, which portrayed the boycott as a kind
of public relations campaign conducted with the blessing of the District, to make it politically
possible to do what District officials already wanted (but were otherwise unable) to do.
211107 F.T.C. at 578 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226
(1940)).
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The court reversed in an opinion by Judge Douglas Ginsburg. As they
had before the Law Judge (and, of course, the Commission), the respondents lost on most issues. 2 9 Just as had Judge Needelman, however,
the D.C. Circuit struggled to find a way to rule for these sympathetic
respondents. Unfortunately for the FTC, the Court's chosen method
may have broader implications for antitrust enforcement than did Judge
Needelman's "tacit endorsement" theory.
The court relied on United States v. O'Brien,2 0 the famous draft card
burning case, to rule that the boycott contained an "element of expression" deserving first amendment protection, and that, accordingly, any
government restriction should be" 'no greater than is essential' to further
the government's interest in protecting competition.''21 Under the facts
of the case, the court said this meant that the FTC could not rely on the
per se rule's normal presumption of market power. 232 The court also
found that the Commission's "truncated rule of reason" analysis was
flawed, since it presumed market power from the success of the boycott,
whereas that success could have resulted either from economic power
or from publicity and political persuasion.
2
At the end of the third long part of its opinion, the court summarized as follows:
"[W]e hold that the SCTLA boycott was an unlawful restraint of trade. Since no 'procompetitive'justification ... has been offered in its defense, and no constitutional barrier has
been interposed, the boycott could properly be condemned as a per se violation of Section
I of the Sherman Act, unless it also comes within the protection of the First Amendment."
7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 59,307. Part four of the court's opinion then found Noerr to be
inapplicable. Only thereafter did the tide turn.
It is interesting that the court gave only cursory attention to the argument that politically
motivated boycotts are not illegal, Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.

& J.

denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); E.T.

SULLIVAN

AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

47-48 (1988). See 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 59,308

HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING

ANTITRUST

n.23 (majority of decisions have disagreed with this proposition).
230 391 U.S. 368 (1968).
231 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 59,313 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
12 For a similar approach, see Note, A Market Power Test for Noncommercial Boycotts, 93
YALE L.J. 505 (1984). In a thoughtful concurrence, Judge Silberman wrote that the key
question in these kind of quasi-political boycott cases is whether the boycotters "in fact
prevailed because of political appeal or commercial might." 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at
59,317 (Silberman, J., concurring). He explained that "if one gets one's way from the
government qua legislator because of political persuasiveness, there is no liability. But using
market power to coerce the government qua economic actor creates a distortion of the
market and the political process." Id. Since boycotts can either "coerce" or "persuade," one
must presume (apparently conclusively) that boycotters with market power prevailed by
coercion, but that other boycotters prevailed by persuasion. For another consideration of
the distinction between "persuasion" and "coercion," see Schachar v. American Academy
of Ophthalmology, Inc., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 67,986 (N.D. III. Feb. 25, 1988)
(denying defense motion for summary judgment) (defendant Academy was so large and
respected that "factors other than the mere persuasive power of its arguments render its
statements influential"; they should be subject to antitrust laws).
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The court went about as far as is seemly to limit its holding to the
facts of this case:
First, our determination that the SCTLA boycott contained an element
of protected expression is not based simply on the petitioners' claim
that they needed to engage in the boycott in order to communicate
effectively; instead, it is based on the "factual context and environment"
in which the boycott was undertaken, including the petitioners' active
efforts to appeal to the public for support of their demand for a raise.
In this regard, their boycott was like the "strike" they called it. Second,
as noted above, our evaluation of the petitioners' conduct is not unaffected by the special concern of the First Amendment with efforts to
petition the government for redress of one's grievances. Where the
measure of this constitutional right is at stake, it is not too much of a
burden on the government to require that it prove rather than presume
the Sherman Act is directed looms in the
that the evil against 2which
3
conduct it condemns.

5

Unfortunately for the FTC, most of the elements central to the "factual
context and environment" of this boycott-including the court-highlighted element of publicity-seeking-would be present in other "strikes"
by workers compensated with public funds (including, most notably,
physicians reimbursed by Medicaid 3 4). The element least likely to be
present-the apparent tacit endorsement of the boycott by the Districtwas discussed by the court but not made central to its reasoning.23 1 Should
the FTC's effort to have the case reconsidered 236 not succeed, the FTC
will be in an awkward position. It may have to take the position that the
District's tacit endorsement, the existence and legal significance of which
it denied, is part of the holding of Superior Court Trial Lawyers. Even if
it would wish it had
the FTC were to succeed, as it might,21372 38presumably
"
alone.
opinion
Needelman's
Judge
left
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 59,314.
See Respondent Federal Trade Commission's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
of Rehearing en banc, at 12-13. See generally Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191
(1983). One irony is that strikes by public employees are prohibited by many state and
local criminal laws.
2 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 59,315:
[T]he Mayor's remarks could ... be interpreted as encouraging the petitioners
to stage a demonstration of their political muscle so that a rate increase could
more easily be justified to the public. Such a demonstration would not offend the
antitrust laws if the petitioners actually lacked the ability to exert any significant
economic pressure on the city.
2 3 The FTC has filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc. No.
86-1465 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 7, 1988). The FTC claims that the opinion "erects formidable
new barriers against antitrust challenges to publicly conducted price-fixing boycotts." Respondent Federal Trade Commission's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing
En Banc at 15.
27 Any holding turning on an activity's "factual context and environment" is susceptible
to being narrowly limited. Moreover, it would not be frivolous to limit Superior Court Trial
2337
234
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B.

THE PROPOSED DETROIT JOINT OPERATING ARRANGEMENT

The Newspaper Preservation Act219 represents a congressional attempt
to accommodate competition and diversity of views. It permits competing
newspapers to combine their non-editorial functions, including pricing,
and to share profits. However, newspapers may form a "Joint Operating
Arrangement" (JOA) only with the advance permission of the attorney
general. The statute directs the attorney general to give permission only
if one of the two newspapers is a "failing newspaper," which is defined
as "a newspaper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in probable danger of financial failure," and only if approving
240
a JOA will "effectuate the policy and purpose" of the Act.
Just before he resigned, Attorney General Meese approved the proposed Detroit Joint Operating Arrangement. By doing so, he effectively
rejected the advice of three experts who had studied the issue: thenAssistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg, who had submitted a 70page report concluding that the newspapers' application had not satisfied
their burden; Assistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule, under whose
direction the Antitrust Division litigated the merits of the proposed J OA;
and Administrative Law Judge Morton Needelman, who conducted the
fact-finding hearing and filed a lengthy opinion recommending that the
is now
JOA be denied. The validity of Attorney General Meese's decision
24
at issue in an 11th hour lawsuit pending in federal court.
Lauyers to situations where the petitioned body has been unusually receptive. Harmed
boycott victims are notoriously vocal protesters, as is suggested by the number of "boycott"
cases, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 40-49, yet here the "victim" declined

to file suit and was conspicuously not among the supporters of the litigation, 107 F.T.C.
at 559 n.222 (initial decision). Why should the antitrust laws conclusively presume injury
when the injured party insists it is unharmed? Moreover, one hopes that the court's attention
to publicity-seeking will not be over-emphasized. Coercion would be increased were the
media summoned to publicize the suffering of patients neglected by striking doctors, the
festering of garbage neglected by striking sanitation workers, and the distress of troubled
youths neglected by striking social workers. Surely the court did not mean that the first
amendment protects all publicized boycotts of governments. Assuming it did not, courts
may seize on the apparent receptivity of the District of Columbia government to this
boycott as a way to limit Superior Court TrialLawyers. Even as so limited, the opinion would
have to be applied with sensitivity, however. Since if "invited" boycotts were lawful, likely
boycotters might coerce targets to issue invitations.
3I Presumably the opinion is most troubling for the facile way it adds a requirement of
proving market power to what is conceivably a substantial part of antitrust enforcement.
For a discussion of the increasingly important role of market power in antitrust cases, and
the failure of the courts adequately to explain the meaning of this requirement, see Briggs
& Calkins, supra note 205, at 276-301.
21915 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04.
240
Id. §§ 1802 (5), 1803.
24! Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorr. y General of the United States
7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 68,219 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1988) (Revercomb, J.), appeal docketed,
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To be charitable, Attorney General Meese's opinion is disappointing.
The question posed by the statute is best understood as asking whether
it is probable-not certain, but probable-that the Free Press (the allegedly failing newspaper) would have been closed had the newspapers not
applied for aJOA . 42 Attorney General Meese never addressed this question. Instead, Attorney General Meese said that the statutory standard
had been met by "the continuing and persistent operating losses suffered
by the Free Press over the course of nearly a decade, with no prospect
of unilaterally reversing that economic condition in the foreseeable future."2 4 He accepted the conclusion of Judge Needelman that those
losses were self-inflicted by the two firms, each of which deliberately
sacrificed short-term profits in order to achieve "dominance" or a JOA,
but apparently he was untroubled by the implications of this. Such behavior, he wrote, merely "signals prudent management judgment. Certainly, newspapers cannot be faulted for considering and acting upon
an alternative that Congress has created. 244
Although Attorney General Meese asserted that he was not influenced
by the newspapers' extraordinary, orchestrated threat to close the Free
Press if a JOA was not granted, 245 in fact the opinion appears very much
the product of someone concerned about that threat. 246 At the end of

the opinion, Attorney General Meese noted that the preservation of
No. 88-5286 (D.C. Cir. argument scheduled for Oct. 28, 1988); see also Michigan Citizens
for an Independent Press v. United States Attorney, Civ. No. 88-2322 (D.D.C. stay pending
review ordered Aug. 17, 1988) (Green, J.).
212Calkins, Comment: The ProposedDetroitJoint OperatingArrangement, 6 WAYNE LAW. 15,
16 (Fall 1987).
24.1In re Application by Detroit Free Press, slip op. at 14. My preferred standard-whether
the weaker paper probably would have been closed had the papers not applied for aJOAhas the advantage of more closely tracking the statutory language. The Attorney General's
approach finds support in Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d
467, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983), but that opinion is inconsistent, cf.
id. at 480 ("Congress intended the phrase 'probable danger of failure' to mean a probability
that the paper would be closed and an editorial voice lost"). The plans of a newspaper's
publisher, if not shaped by litigation concerns, are the best evidence of the financial viability
of a paper, and the Act does not preclude reliance on these plans. Calkins, supra note 242,
at 16-17.
44
I at 13.
ld.
Slip op. at 11 n.4 ("Following the Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law
Judge, Knight-Ridder took certain steps to underscore its corporate intention to close the
Free Press if there is no approval of the JOA. Since those maneuvers occurred after the
close of the record, they have not been included in any consideration of the instant
application.").
"" See also Threat of paper's death swayed decision, exec says, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 11,
1988, at 3A, col. 4, 6A, col. 2 (Knight-Ridder Inc. Chairman said lobbying campaign "'was
critical to the ultimate success' of the JOA application").
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multiple editorial voices in Detroit is "an outcome that does not appear
2 47
to be in the future otherwise" than through a JOA.
This could be characterized as "boot-strap litigation." Knight-Ridder
and the Detroit News each deliberately lost money in order to achieve
market dominance. There is rio persuasive evidence that Knight-Ridder
seriously considered closing the Free Press.24 ' Then, promptly after Gannett bought the Detroit News, the two newspapers petitioned the government to allow them to end their competition. In a joint brief filed with
Attorney General Meese, Knight-Ridder and Gannett argued that he
must grant what is in effect a monopoly because otherwise the Free Press
would continue to lose money. The Free Press would continue to lose
money, the brief argued, because the DetroitNews would continue deliberately to lose money in order to inflict losses on the Free Press. The brief
249
relied on the testimony of Gannett's chairman as proof of its intent.
It is remarkable that two major corporate firms would be bold enough
to make such an argument. It is even more surprising that the Attorney
General would adopt that argument as his own. Losses deliberately inflicted for the purpose of achieving dominance should be disregarded
250
unless the market is too small to support more than a single newspaper.
Knight-Ridder's current intentions concerning the Free Press also should
be disregarded, lest the legal system reward the most brazen firms; the
only relevant "intent" question should ask what the parties would have
done had they not applied for a JOA."' Attorney General Meese did
not address this and other difficult questions, and he expressly found
that the Detroit newspaper market could support two profitable newspapers. 25 2 If that finding is correct, approval of the JOA based upon
predation-induced losses, if that is what these were, is inappropriate.
"I7 Id. at 13.
214 Recommended Decision at 93-95, In re: Application by Detroit Free Press (filed Dec. 29,
1987).
214 Reply Memorandum of Detroit Free Press, Incorporated and the Detroit News, Inc.
at 24, In re: Application by Detroit Free Press (brief filed Oct. 14, 1987).
2150Calkins, supra note 242, at 18.
211Id. Unfortunately, the District Court wrote that it was proper to give weight to KnightRidder's threat to close the Free Press. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 59,423.
252 In re Application of Detroit Free Press, slip op. at 9 n.3 (agreeing with the Law Judge
that two profitable papers could be sustained if prices were increased). In the cited footnote,
Attorney General Meese added that "both Knight Ridder and Gannett have elected to
forego sharing the prize, resisting price increases in an effort to gain market dominance."
It is particularly disappointing that the Attorney General failed even to mention the
evidence that most impressed the Antitrust Division, namely, Gannett's willingness to share
JOA revenues almost evenly. (The Division argued, not unreasonably, that Gannett would
be less generous with a newspaper that was likely to fail.)
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Attorney General Meese's decision has withstood challenge in federal
district court, and may survive on appeal. 53 The case is difficult. Left
unchanged, the decision is an invitation to newspapers in two-paper cities
to engage in predation, comforted by the knowledge that the reward
for failure may be a JOA. Reversed, the "failing newspaper" test might
become so stringent that JOAs become unavailable as a practical matter,
since by the time a paper qualified as "failing" no competitor would be
interested. It will take considerable judicial craftsmanship to find a prudential mean.

The newspapers and the Attorney General are aided substantially by the requirement
that courts defer to administrative decision-makers. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

